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1. INTRODUCTION 
Company takeovers first emerged in the United States and the U.K. 
during the late 1940' s as a technique for gaining control of a 
company without the need to negotiate a merger of the traditional 
kind with its directors. The last twenty years have seen a rapid 
increase in the number of takeovers taking place either as part of a 
contentious battle for control or as a convenient means of vesting 
control in the offeror, where the offeror and the controllers of the 
target company are in agreement. 
The recent phenomenon of inflation pushing up asset values, without 
a corresponding effect on share prices has made the company takeover 
a convenient and cheap method of acquiring business assets and 
rationalising their use. 
In recent years the use of takeovers has been growing rapidly. In 
the 1983-84 period 179 proposals were notified to the Commerce 
Commission and figures for June 1984 suggest a further increase for 
the 1984-85 period. 1 Takeovers are therefore becoming a more 
significant part of the economy's allocation of resources. Further, 
takeovers have become an important method of introducing foreign 
capital to New Zealand enterprise. Legislation to regulate takeover 
conduct was introduced in New Zealand in the Companies Amendment Act 
1963. rbwever, over the last twenty years the inadequacies of this 
statute have been realised and exploited with the result that most 
transfers in control now take place outside the scope of the Act and 
without any substantive control. 
The recent New Zealand Forest Products Limited ( "N. Z. F. P. ") takeover 
offer for Wattie Industries Limited ( "\~at tie") demonstrated that 
there is no effective mechanism to ensure takeovers are conducted 
fairly. The unsatisfactory state of our laws governing company 
takeovers, particularly in relation to protection of investors, has 
become obvious. 
In October 1983, the Securities Commission completed a review of the 
rules governing takeover activity and suggested extensive reforms of 
the rules. It is the aim of this paper to investigate the present 
2. 
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situation of takeover control, by looking at the litigation surroun-
ding the N.Z.F.P. offer, and to look at the suggested reforms in the 
light of the N.Z.F .P. offer and see what practical changes will 
result. 
The absence of legislation controlling the conduct of takeovers in 
relation to investor protection is in sharp contrast to legislation 
controlling takeovers in relation to the public interest. Approval, 
where required, of the Commerce Commission under the Commerce Act 
1975 and the Overseas Investment Act 1973, safeguards the public 
interest which may be adversely affected by takeovers. This paper 
is however primarily concerned with protection of investors who may 
be unfairly treated in a transfer of control and may suffer substan-
tial loss in their investment. Their interests are as equally in 
need of protection as the general public interest because, if no 
protection is given, the confidence and efficiency of the capital 
market will be affected resulting in profound effects on the 
national well-being. The size of the parties and the amount of 
money involved in the N.Z.F .P. offer adequately demonstrates this. 
The formulation of rules which adequately protect these interests is 
therefore important. 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
The Parties 
New Zealand Forest Products Limited ( "N. Z. F. P. ") is New Zealand's 
largest public company in terms of capital and trading activity. It 
has shareholders funds in excess of $4 75 million and has 57, OOO 
individual shareholders. It first obtained Stock Exchange listing 
as a public company in 1936. 
On the 18th of January 1984 the executive of the New Zealand Stock 
Exchange attempted to suspend N. Z. F. P. from listing on the Exchange 
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for alleged breaches of the Exchange's Takeover Code. N.Z.F.P. were 
allegedly in breach of the code because of the terms of their 
takeover offer for Wattie Industries Limited ( "Wattie"). Wattie is 
f\ew Zealand's seventh largest company. 
The original structure for stock exchanges in New Zealand was 
provided by the Sharebrokers Act 1908, whereby sharebrokers, 
licensed under the Act, could form associations and set up stock 
exchanges which could be registered under the Act. 3 Rules could 
then be made for the running of the Exchange in very much the same 
way as they are for any other incorporated society, except that they 
had to be approved by the Governor-General in Council and gazetted. 
A number of exchanges were in fact established4 and it is still, 
in theory, possible that a new exchange could be registered under 
the 1908 Act. The members of the exchanges however, felt that some 
national body was needed to promote and regulate matters of common 
interest to the exchanges at a national level. The Stock Exchange 
Association of f\ew Zealand was established in 1915 and registered 
under the Act. It was with this body that N.Z.F .P. executed its 
current listing agreement on the 9th of July 1976. When this 
agreement was entered into the listing manual had no stipulations 
about the conduct of takeovers, but the agreement did provide that 
N.Z.F.P. would comply with the relevant requirements and conditions 
as from time to time set out in the Listing Manual. On the 14th of 
October 1981, Parliament enacted the Sharebrokers Amendment Act 
1981, which came into force on the 18th of July 1983 by order in 
C:Juncil. This Act created the New Zealand Stock Exchange as the 
successor of the Association and the Exchanges registered under the 
1908 Act. The Exchange is a body corporate in very much the same 
way as any other incorporated society. Section 3(3) contains a 
number of provisions to facilitate the transition. The functions 
and powers of the Exchange are laid out in Section 4 of the Act. 
The Exchange is given power to make rules for the conduct of its 
members and the conduct of business on its exchange, its members 
being those licensed sharebrokers granted a seat on the Exchange. 
B. 
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These rules however must be approved by the Governor-General in 
Council and published in the Gazette. 5 
Rules were in fact made by the Association in anticipation of the 
transition, as provided for in Section 7 ( 4) and were approved and 
gazetted on the 8th of July 1983. 6 These Rules deal with a number 
of matters including a section on listing of companies on the 
exchange. Rule 12.02 provides a right to suspend or cancel listings 
without reason. Rule 8.07 delegates to the executive of the 
Exchange all powers and functions of the Council not specifically 
reserved. Rule 8.08 gives power to make regulations, not inconsis-
tent with Rules, governing matters of detail or administrative 
machinery. No mention is made in the Rules about takeovers. 
In October 1978 a circular was sent to listed companies by the Stock 
Exchange Association in which the Takeover Code appeared for the 
first time. The code however was not stated to have effect. In 
1981, the Association sent to listed companies what it called trie 
"1981 Edition" of the Listing Manual. This document was said to 
incorporate over 70 changes from a draft sent the preceding April, 
as a result of submissions. This Manual was prepared in anticipa-
tion of the passing of the Sharebrokers Amendment Act. 
Preliminary Buying 
The Goodman Group Limited ("Goodman") as at November 1983 held 35 
percent of the shares in Wattie and Wattie held 30 percent of the 
shares in Goodman. 
In November 1983 Wattie and Goodman acquired 24.9 percent 7 of the 
shares of N.Z.F.P. This was done using an equally owned subsidiary, 
Dominion Industries ("Dominion"). This buying took place over a 
period of three trading days by "standing in the market". 8 The 
operation was commenced, as most takeovers seem to be, on a Friday, 
the 18th of November. At this stage N.Z.F .P. was in the middle of 
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an unsuccessful takeover of Odlins Limited, a takeover later 
completed by the Brierley Group. Further, Wattie/Goodman were not 
the only buyers in the market at the time and the operation deve-
loped into somewhat of a buying spree of N.Z.F.P. shares. On the 
Friday approximately 13.4 million N.Z.F.P. shares were traded. 
Heavy trading continued on the following Monday and Tuesday. 
Dominion had achieved a 24.9 percent holding in N.Z.F.P. and a 
second buyer finished the day with a three percent holding. 
Al together 28 percent of N. Z. F. P. 's shares had changed hands in 
three days of trading. One could forgive N.Z.F.P. had they jumped 
to the conclusion that they were the victim of an as yet unannounced 
takeover bid. At this time the share market was in a state of boom, 
it was also a time of general monetary liquidity for the share 
market. At the same time T.N.L. were being foiled by Dominion 
Breweries in their attempt to takeover Mount Cook Airlines. Further 
Wattie/Goodman had just completed their merger with Waitaki-NZR. 
t'bvember 1983 was a highly active month for takeovers. 
On the 22nd of t'bvember Wattie/Goodman made the statement that its 
holding .in N.Z.F .P. "would ensure that New Zealand corporate 
interests held a strategic investment in an industry which was vital 
for the long-term growth of New Zealand". 9 Further, that Dominion 
Industries supported the Board and management of N.Z.F.P. and that 
there was "no threat to the company". Buying was merely "further 
long-term investment in the processing of New Zealand's natural 
resources". 
This however cannot have impressed N.Z.F.P. because on Monday the 
19th of December N.Z.F.P. launched a week of defensive buying, with 
a stated object of achieving a 24. 9 percent holding in Wattie. As 
the week progressed Wattie shares rose in price from $4.50 to $5.00 
each. At the same time N. Z. F. P. began buying Goodman' s shares and 
on the 24th were reported to have bought a 6. 3 percent holding in 
Goodman. 10 
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What exactly the motives of N.Z.F.P. were for their buying spree is 
unknown. Brokers in the market found the buying spree hard to 
understand and their only explanation was that it was to break up 
the Wattie/Goodman holding in N.Z.F .P. 11 A substantial holding in 
Wattie would certainly have controlled the Wattie-Goodman influence 
on N.Z.F .P. Neither company was seen as having great development 
potential and therefore unlikely for takeover or investment. On the 
21st of December the then Labour Party spokesperson, David caygill, 
made the comment that "the N. Z. F. P. counter-attack showed the deep 
malice in New Zealand industry". f-bwever if the move was purely 
malicious it was an expensive investment of shareholders funds to 
undertake so lightly. 
Qi Friday the 23rd N.Z.F.P. announced that they had achieved their 
target of 24.9 percent of Wattie shares at a cost of approximately 
$115 million. 
C. The Takeover Offer 
After trading closed on the 23rd N.Z.F.P. announced that they would 
be making a written takeover offer for Wattie through its subsidiary 
Alfred Quaife (NZ) Limited, which later became known as N. Z. F. P. 
Investment Limited. At the time of making the offer Mr Lynn Papps, 
Olairman of N.Z.F.P., said that N.Z.F.P. had been for some time 
considering a move into another New Zealand resource based industry, 
in expectation that following C.E.R. there would be growing opportu-
nities for the export of primary resources, such as feed, pulp and 
paper, to the Paci fie Basin. N. Z. F. P. considered Wattie a compa-
tible, strong, well-managed company with good growth prospects of 
gains in dividend income. The merger would provide greater access 
to off-shore capital and expanded trading opportunities. All in all 
the N.Z.F.P. offer could have cost around $300 million and so 
significant returns should be expected. 
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The consent of the Examiner of Commercial Practices, required under 
the Commerce Act 1975, had however not been obtained and was not 
expected for at least 39 days. The reason for N.Z.F.P.'s failure to 
get consent prior to announcing the off er, as is the normal prac-
tice, seems to be that the decision to ~ake the offer was only made 
in mid-December after consideration had been made of all aspects of 
the existing situation and the success of the "standing in the 
market" for Wattie shares. This would seem to cast some doubt on 
the forward planning of the takeover offer. 
The terms of the offer were however complicated because of the 
complex system of cross shareholdings. As previously mentioned 
Goodman held a 35 percent share of Wattie. The consideration for 
N.Z.F.P.'s offer was four fully paid N.Z.F.P. shares and one dollar 
in cash for every five ordinary shares in Wattie, with variations 
for the different classes of preference shares. 12 Therefore if 
the offer was extended to those shares held beneficially by Goodman 
or its subsidiary, the result would be an increase in Goodman' s 
holding in N.Z.F.P .. When added to the 24.9 percent holding already 
held by the Goodman/Wattie nominee, Dominion, the extension of the 
full offer to Goodman could result in a reverse takeover situation. 
Assuming that Goodman would take half of the Dominion holding i n 
N.Z.F.P., and assuming that Goodman sold all their Wattie shares to 
N.Z.F.P., the result would be that Goodman would hold approximately 
30 percent of the shares in N.Z.F.P. This is considered by most to 
be a controlling interest and is at least enough not to be consi-
dered in the best interests of N.Z.F .P. shareholders. 13 The offer 
was therefore limited to those shares not beneficially held by 
Goodman or its subsidiaries and meant that the offer was aimed at 
only 41. l percent of the shares in Wattie to achieve a 65 percent 
holding for N.Z.F.P. 
This however gave rise to further problems for N.Z.F.P. Because 
N.Z.F.P. were seeking such a small percentage of the total sharehol-
ding, it only required a third party, friendly to Wattie/Goodman or 
interested in Wattie's independence, to acquire 16 percent of Wattie 
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shares to block the takeover. It should also be noted that while 
N.Z.F.P. were assembling their 24.9 percent holding in Wattie other 
unnamed parties had been active in the market. Such a "white 
knight" manoeuvre had recently been used by Dominion Breweries to 
save Mount Cook Airlines from the T.N.L. Group. 
Further conditions to N. Z. F. P. offer were, that it was conditional 
on attaining a maximum 90 percent acceptance from those to whom 
offers were made, or a minimum of 20 million acceptances. The offer 
was therefore not only made to part of the Wattie shareholding, 
loosely termed a "partial" offer, but also conditional on a stated 
minimum acceptance. The offer was further conditional on the 
granting of consent by the Examiner of Commercial Practices uncondi-
tionally or on a condition acceptable to N.Z.F .P. on or before the 
14th of May 1984. Acceptances closed on Wednesday the 29th of 
February. There was therefore the possibility that acceptors would 
have their shares tied up for two and a half months before they knew 
if N.Z.F.P. were bound by their acceptance. 
D. Reaction to the Offer 
The initial reaction of Wattie to the takeover offer was negative. 
The Board of Wattie wrote to its shareholders and advised them not 
to accept. They said the consideration was "grossly inadequate" and 
was unfair since it was not extended to Goodman. 
14 This reaction 
Mr Lynn Papps called "rather defensive" .15 
N. Z. F. P. 's chances of success were however not highly rated. The 
general feeling was that the bid had sprung from the reaction to the 
Wattie/Goodman holding in N.Z.F.P. rather than a carefully thought 
out business expansion strategy.
16 As for the possible outcome 
three predictions were made; that a Wattie/Goodman' s "friend" would 
buy up 16% holding in Wattie and frustrate the offer, that a 
takeover move would be made for N. Z. F. P. itself, or a legal chal-
lenge would hold the offer up for some months. Gordon Wattie 
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however said that he would not be surprised if the bid was success-
ful. These mixed feelings led some financial observers to question 
the future of the N. Z. F. P. management. 16 It was claimed that if 
this bid, coming so closely on the heels of the unsuccessful bid for 
Odlins, proved to be a failure, questions might be raised about the 
management. This rather sensationalist view, while adding to the 
general atmosphere, proved to be unfounded. 
From the 29th of December a series of "detailed negotiations" took 
place between N.Z.F.P., Wattie and Goodman representatives to 
discuss the takeover. The negotiations were aimed at, and looked 
likely to result in, an agreement under which N.Z.F.P. and Goodman 
would have been restricted to a limited but equal shareholding of 
Wattie, thus preserving Wattie 's independent position. W. T. 
Morriss, Chairman at Wattie, blamed the collapse of these negotia-
17 tions on Goodman being unprepared to proceed. Goodman denied 
responsibility for the breakdown, however its reluctance to agree 
can be understood in the light of later developments. 
Tne talks broke down on t he 17th of January and the Wattie Board 
issued a revised letter of advice to shareholders .18 On the 9th '" 
the formal offer was distributed and a letter from Messrs G.P. 
Shirtcliffe and P.H. Goodman, the Goodman nominees on the Wattie 
Board, was also distributed. 
The letter to shareholders from the Wattie Board, excluding the 
Goodman nominees, reverses the initial advice and recommends 
acceptance of the offer. The previous statement from Wattie that 
the consideration was "grossly inadequate" is explained away in the 
letter as "adopting a defensive approach in order to facilitate 
discussion with N.Z.F.P.". In the light of N.Z.F.P. 's statement 
that no increase in consideration was possible and private discus-
sions between N.Z.F.P. and Goodman, which contained proposals which 
would have had "serious consequences for Wattie and its sharehol-
ders", the Wattie Board recommended acceptance of the offer. 
f-bwever, the letter went on to recommend that shareholders no t 
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accept the offer until the decision of the Examiner of Commercial 
Practices was known and thus not lose the power to deal with their 
shares in the intervening period. rbpe was still held that the 
takeover would eventually be unsuccessful and Wattie's independence 
would be preserved. Most Wattie shareholders did follow this advice 
and only approximately 1000 shareholders accepted N.Z.F.P. 's offer. 
The Goodman nominees directors understandably did not agree with 
this recommendation. In their letter to Wattie shareholders19 
they query the reversal of the Board's recommendation. The adequacy 
of the consideration is questioned by examining some of the calcula-
tions used in the N. Z. F. P. valuation of Wattie. Attention is also 
drawn to the restrictive voting rights enjoyed by N.Z.F .P. 
shares20 and the ~onditional nature of the offer. 
This letter was however only a 
the offer. They also wrote 
seeking the support of the 
small part of Goodman's opposition to 
to the New Zealand Stock Exchange 
Exchange for opposition. Finally 
Goodman' s board members arranged a protective buying campaign for 
Wattie shares to block the takeover. 
E. The Defensive Tactics 
If the takeover had gone ahead in its stated terms, it would indeed 
have resulted in a serious loss for Goodman. The Goodman holding of 
35 percent in Wattie would have been substantially reduced in 
value. Goodman would have been reduced to holding a 35 percent 
minority in a private company where the remainder of the shares were 
held in one 65 percent controlling block. Goodman would have had no 
say in the future of Wattie and any premium paid by Goodman to 
reflect the control potential of their interest would have been lost 
by the takeover. As the Goodman Board said in a statement on the 
17th of June: 21 
"Goodman's shareholding in Wattie is its largest single 
investment and a key element in the group's ability to 
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provide strong commercial leadership and impetus in the 
food industry." 
Goodman argued that not only would the investment, which was worth 
approximately $28 million, be seriously reduced in value but also 
that Goodman's position as a leader in the food industry would have 
been lost and the market would have reacted accordingly. 
Further to this loss, Goodman' s interest in N. Z. F. P. itself, held 
through Cominion, would lose value, due to the massive issue of 
N. Z. F. P. shares required to complete the takeover. Al together it 
was estimated by professional advisors that a successful bid by 
N.Z.F.P. would have reduced Goodman's market capitalisation by at 
least $120 million. It is therefore understandable why the Goodman 
Board considered it crucial to the interests of Goodman's sharehol-
ders that Wattie remain a listed, independent company. 
In pursuance of this the Goodman Board made a protective arrangement 
with Brierley Investments Limited (Brierley). Brierley bought 
Wattie shares on the market and thus attempted to block the N.Z.F.P. 
offer. The shares were then sold to the Dairy Board which had 
intended to acquire closer links with Wattie but not at the inflated 
price prevailing on the market at the time. Goodman made up the 
difference between the market price at which Brierley bought the 
shares and the below market price at which they were sold to the 
Dairy Board. Together with fees for Brierley and financing costs 
the scheme cost Goodman approximately $20 million. The Securities 
Commission is at present investigating this and other aspects of the 
takeover. In the end Brierley managed to warehouse approximately 
11. 7 percent of Wattie 's total shareholding. A further 2 percent 
was sold to friendly parties with the help of two other companies, 
suspected to be the Saudi Corporation, a merchant Bank; and T. N. L. 
of which Goodman owns a 20 percent holding. 22 Brierley was paid 
for its efforts by a special issue of 4. 7 million ordinary Goodman 
shares, which were eventually sold to third parties by Brierley. 
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F. Withdrawal of the Offer 
On Friday the 17th of February N.Z.F.P. withdrew its offer and 
reached an agreement with Goodman. This agreement involved Board 
representation in Wattie for N. Z. F. P. and Board representation in 
N. Z. F. P. for Dominion Industries, the equally owned subsidiary of 
Wattie/Goodman. Further agreements were reached on the question of 
limiting cross-shareholdings between the companies. N.Z.F.P.'s 
holding in Wattie subsequently fell to 23. 7 percent and Dominion's 
holding in N. Z. F. P. fell to 23. 6 percent. On the same day the 
application for consent was withdrawn from the Examiner of Commer-
cial Practices. Further, the Securities Commission announced a full 
inquiry into all dealings with the three companies' shares as far 
back as the 1st of June 1980. 23 
The reason for the withdrawal of the off er is unclear. Mr Shirt-
cli ff said24 subsequently, that it was the result of Goodman's 
defensive tactics. This may not be strictly true, as a 16 percent 
holding was required to absolutely block the success of the take-
over, however Brierley' s buying must certainly have slowed accep-
tances for N.Z.F.P. 's offer. The three Wattie nominees on the 
Goodman Board, Messrs W. Morriss, J. Haworth and C. Lyon, said in a 
statement25 that they were not parties to, and did not know of, 
the action to involve Brierley. Further Mr Haworth said that it was 
not accepted that the offer was withdrawn because of the Brierley 
action. He said: 
"In the opinion of the Wattie Board the N.Z.F.P. bid 
failed primarily because of Wattie's opposition and the 
refusal of the Examiner of Commercial Practices to give 
consent." 
What exactly is meant by "Wattie's opposition" is unclear, however 
the truth of the matter may well be that a combination of factors 
resulted in the frustration of the offer, these factors being the 
Brierley buying reducing the number of available acceptances, the 
reluctance of Wattie 's shareholders to make early acceptances, the 
G. 
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intervention of the l'ew Zealand Stock Exchange, the lack of an 
answer from the Examiner and the prospect that the case was highly 
likely to go to a hearing of the Commerce Commission. With the NZ 
Growers Association and the trade unions calling for a Commerce 
Commission hearing, N.Z.F.P. must have seen the possibility of 
waiting for months before a decision was made either way. 
The Stock Exchange Suspension 
Ch the 23rd of December, the day that N.Z.F.P. announced its offer, 
it also advised the Stock Exchange of the off er. On the 30th of 
December the Executive Director of the Exchange, Mr R.B. Gill, sent 
a telex to the Managing Director of N.Z.F.P., Mr W. 1-k..Jnt, asserting 
that the offer, by restriction to only Wattie shareholders other 
than Goodman or its subsidiaries, appeared to be in breach of Clause 
612 of the Takeover Code of the Exchange. N.Z.F.P. were requested 
to explain why all shareholders were not being treated equally. 
Clause 612 which was inserted into the Listing Manual in 1981, reads: 
"All shareholders of the same class shall be treated 
similarly by the offerer except that allotments of less 
than a marketable parcel of shares may be satisfied by 
cash. The amount shall be stated in the offer docu-
ments." 
Mr 1-k..Jnt replied on the same day, asserting that N.Z.F.P. were not in 
breach of Clause 612 and pointing out that the Companies Amendment 
Act 1963 places no obligation on the company to make offers to all 
shareholders of the target company. The N.Z.F.P. offer was in fact 
fully within the terms of the 1963 Act. Mr 1-k..Jnt 's view was that 
Clause 612 meant only that those shareholders of the same class to 
whom an offer was made had to be treated similarly and not that a 
similar offer had to be made to all shareholders in the class. 
When this reply was received on the 4th of January Mr Greene, Vice 
President of the Exchange, attempted unsuccessfully to contact Mr 
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1-lJnt by telephone and talk N.Z.F .P. into amending the terms of the 
offer in a way that would be acceptable to the Exchange. Mr Hunt 
however did not reply to Mr Greene's attempts to contact him. 
0-, the 9th of January Mr Gill sent a further telex to N. Z. F. P. 
reiterating its view of Clause 612. On the 13th of January N.Z.F.P. 
despatched the written offer and on the 16th confirmed to the 
Exchange that the takeover was proceeding. Goodman representatives 
confirmed that Goodman was not a party to this exclusion from the 
offer. 
On the 18th of January 1984 a meeting of the Executive of the 
Exchange was convened and as a result Mr Gill sent a telex to the 
Chairman of N.Z.F.P., Wattie and Goodman, and later to the regional 
exchanges and to the media. This telex re-affirmed the Exchange' s 
interpretation of Clause 612, asserted the Exchange's duty to 
protect minority shareholders in target companies and advised that 
quotation of N.Z.F.P. 's shares on the New Zealand Stock Exchange 
would be suspended from Monday the 23rd of January, and similar 
action would be sought from Australian Stock Exchanges, until such 
time as N.Z.F.P. complied with Clause 612. The telex noted that the 
Securities Commission's review of the law and practice on takeovers 
specifically proposed giving Clause 612, as interpreted by the 
Exchange, the force of law. 
The suspension was to be indefinite and the Exchange hoped it would 
result in bringing pressure to bear on N.Z.F.P. to comply with the 
Takeover Code. The Exchange considered that there had been a 
serious breach of the Takeover Code resulting in a loss of free-
dealing and discriminatory treatment of shareholders. The delay in 
implementation of the suspension was to avoid some of the undesir-
able effects on small shareholders; those small shareholders of a 
mind to sell would have the chance to do so before the suspension 
took place. 
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N.Z.F.P. replied through its chairman, Lynn Papps, that it expected 
the suspension to have little effect on the takeover, as shares 
would continue to be traded off-market. 26 On January the 21st 
however, three days before the suspension was to have effect, 
N.Z.F.P. made an ex parte application for an injunction restraining 
the Stock Exchange. This application was granted. Lynn Papps 
stated that the application was made because: 27 
"We want more time to discuss with the Stock Exchange." 
On the 26th of January the matter was given a full hearing before 
Barker J. and on the 7th of February judgment was delivered uphol-
ding the injunction. 28 The Stock Exchange appealed this decision 
to the Court of Appeal for a declaratory judgment on questions 
relating to the legal status of the Listing Manual, which contained 
the Takeover Code. This appeal was heard on the 11 th and 12th of 
July and judgment was delivered by Woodhouse P. on the 30th of 
July29 finding for the Exchange on the questions put to the 
Court. By the time the appeal was heard however N.Z.F.P. had 
withdrawn its takeover bid and had withdrawn from the proceedings. 
The appeal was defended by the Listed Companies Association Inc. and 
an amicus curiae acting in place of N.Z.F.P. 
3. N.Z.F.P. v. NEW ZEALAND STOCK EXCHAI\CE 
A. 
The Stock Exchange' s action and the ensuing litigation raised some 
interesting points concerning the status of the Exchange's controls 
of the securities market, in particular the status and interpreta-
tion of the New Zealand Stock Exchange's Takeover Code. 
Preliminary Points 
The case was first argued in the High Court before Barker J. who 
delivered a lengthy oral judgment. Before beginning to study the 
B. 
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issues of the case in hand Barker J. made a clear statement that the 
Court would not be concerned with commercial considerations, the 
desirability of the takeover, or the public interest considerations 
of the case. The judgment of the case was isolated to the law in 
its present state, despite the considerable debate on the adequacy 
of the law in this area, and was isolated to the necessary legal 
questions only. 
Two further necessary preliminary points were made. Firstly it was 
clearly stated that the offer was fully within the requirements of 
the 1963 Companies Amendment Act. Nothing in this Act requires an 
offer to be made to all shareholders of the target company. Section 
2 of the Act clearly contemplates partial acquisitions of a com-
pany's capital. There is however more than one method of making a 
"partial" offer. There is the limiting of eligible offerees, as 
took place in this case, and there is the extension of offers to all 
shareholders and pro-rating of acceptances to the level of sharehol-
ding required. The latter type is the only type of "partial" offer 
permitted in many jurisdictions. Whether or not either type of 
partial offer should be permitted was however not a question for the 
Court. 
Secondly it was pointed out by the Court that vague allegations of 
the "spirit" of the legislation or rules do not provide any reliable 
basis for interpretation of a contract or legislation. The inten-
tion of the Exchange in seeking to protect the interests of small 
shareholders is no aid to interpretation. Barker J. quoted from 
McCarthy J. (as he then was) in the Court of Appeal decision 
Multiplex Industries Limited v. Speer: 30 
"We must construe the Act as it is, not legislate by 
extending clear language." 
Issues Before the High Court 
Broadly two distinct legal questions were raised before the High 
Court. The first question raised was what power did the Exchange 
c. 
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have to suspend listing and what were the limitations or conditions 
imposed on this power? It was this question which was eventually 
taken to the Court of Appeal by the Stock Exchange. In this area 
Barker J. also made some interesting comments about the appropriate-
ness of suspension as a sanction and the unsatisfactory state of the 
law governing company takeovers and investor protection. The 
Court's decision in this area has considerable effect on the scope 
of investor protection offered by law. 
The second major question before the High Court was the interpreta-
tion of Clause 612. If the Exchange had a right to suspend listing, 
which was conditional upon the breach of this clause, then whether 
or not N. Z. F. P. 's actions breached the clause became crucial. The 
Courts decision on this point, though not taken to the Court of 
Appeal, also had implications for any proposed legislat ion. 
Questions Removed to the Court of Appeal 
Four questions were put to the Court of Appeal for a Declaratory 
Judgment under the Declaratory Judgments Act 1908. These questions 
arose from the High Court's findings on the status of the Listing 
Manual and the Exchange's power of suspension. Barker J. held that 
the Exchange was required by the Shareborkers Amendment Act to 
stipulate the conditions in the form of Rules of the Exchange and 
not as terms of the Listing Agreement, as had been done before the 
Act. 31 Alternatively it was held that if the Exchange could 
stipulate listing requirements by way of contract, then the 
Exchange's power to vary these requirements was limited. 32 The 
Exchange felt, for reasons which will be discussed later, that it 
was important to clarify these issues, even though N.Z.F.P.'s offer 
had been withdrawn. The questions before the Court of Appeal were 
therefore framed to resolve these issues and not to specifically 
address the matters in issue between N.Z.F.P. and the Exchange. The 
formal questions were as follows: 
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Question 1: 
Do the provisions of Section 7 of the Sharebrokers 
Amendment Act 1981 require the l\ew Zealand Stock 
Exchange to make, as Rules in terms of that section, 
the conditions and requirements to be complied with by 
incorporated companies if such companies are listed on 
the exchange operated by the l\ew Zealand Stock Exchange? 
Question 2: 
Does the l\ew Zealand Stock Exchange have jurisdiction 
to make as rules, in terms of Section 7 of the Act, 
provisions purporting to stipulate the conditions upon 
which incorporated companies will be granted official 
listing on the exchange operated by the New Zealand 
' 
Stock Exchange? 
Question 3: 
Is the Listing Agreement binding on N.Z.F.P. and 
enforceable against it? 
Question 4: 
On its true construction does the obligation accepted 
by N. Z. F. P. under the Listing Agreement extend to and 
include an obligation to observe and perform all the 
provisions of the listing requirements as may be varied 
from time to time and forwarded to it by the New 
Zealand Stock Exchange? 
D. 
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The Exchange's Power of Suspension 
On the First Issue before the High Court, the status of the Listing 
Manual and the Exchange's power of suspension, the Plaintiff 
(N.Z.F.P.) made two submissions which corresponded with the two 
possible sources of the Exchange's power. The thrust of both 
submissions was that the Exchange had, in this particular case, no 
power of suspension. Firstly it was submitted that N.Z.F.P. was not 
bound in contract by the provisions of the Takeover Code which did 
not form part of the Usting Agreement between the parties. Further 
it was submitted that the Takeover Code constituted "Rules" of the 
Exchange which had not been made in compliance with Section 7 of the 
Sharebrokers Amendment Act 1981. The Takeover Code was therefore 
invalid and not binding upon N.Z.F.P. Both these submissions 
relied upon the assumption that any power of suspension the Exchange 
may have, is conditional upon a breach of either the listing 
contract or of the rules of the Exchange. 
The primary submission by the Defendant ( The Stock Exchange) was 
however that the Stock Exchange had a right to suspend or cancel the 
right of quotation at any time. This right was conferred by Rule 
12.0233 of the Gazetted Rules of the Stock Exchange. Further, 
this right expressly formed part of the Plaintiff's Listing Agree-
ment, accordingly it was not necessary for the Defendant to estab-
lish whether there had been a breach of the Takeover Code before 
taking action to suspend. It was therefore unnecessary to discuss 
the status of the Takeover Code because the Exchange had an absolute 
power, conferred in contract, to suspend. Rule 12.02 reads: 
"A company desiring to have its equity or loan securi-
ties or any class or classes thereof granted the right 
of quotation on the official list shall make applica-
tion in that behalf to the Executive Office of the 
Exchange and pay the fee from time to time prescribed 
by the Executive. The Executive may, without assigning 
any reason, refuse to grant such securities or class of 
such securities the right of quotation on the official 
list and similarl ma at an time sus end or cancel 
such right of quotation." emphasis added 
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It was this power that the Exchange sought to exercise against 
N.Z.F.P., a suspension from the Official List. This power is 
transferred into the Exchange's contract with the listed company by 
Clause 4 of the standard form listing agreement. This clause reads: 
"4. The Company acknowledges that, in accordance 
with the rules and regulations of the Exchange 
the Exchange may at any time suspend or cancel 
the Company's right of quotation on its Official 
List• II 
This power is again repeated in the Listing Manual by Clause 108 
which reads: 
"108. The Exchange reserves the right to cancel or 
suspend listing or quotation of any security 
without assigning a reason." 
This clause, contained in the 1976 Manual, is part of N.Z.F.P. 's 
contract with the Exchange by virtue of Clause l(b) of the Listing 
Agreement which reads: 
"(b) Comply with the relevant Requirements and 
Conditions of the Official Listing as from time 
to time set out in the Exchange's Listing Manual." 
The Defendant's argument therefore was that the suspension of the 
Plaintiff was merely an exercise of this power, and whether or not 
the Takeover Code is valid or binding is irrelevant to that power. 
Barker J. however did not accept this interpretation of the 
Exchange' s power, and held that the Exchange is not allowed to 
suspend arbitrarily. Barker J. 's reason for this conclusion was 
that the Exchange was a Statutory Body, charged by the legislation 
with a number of public interest duties. Such a body, it was held, 
cannot have been authorised to act wholly capriciously. The only 
support for this contention is that Clause 606 of the Takeover Code 
states: 
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"606. Where the shares of either offeror or offeree 
company are listed, Exchanges will normally 
continue quotations during currency of the offer 
except that the Exchange may suspend quotations 
if it believes that: 
* a false market exists; or 
* a breach of this Code has been commit-
ted; or 
* there is non-compliance with the 
requirements of the Listing Manual 
(including "Spread")." 
From this Barker J. concludes that the Listing Manual itself 
indicates that there has to be some breach of the listing require-
ments for the listed company to be suspended. 
There are however a couple of points that should be noted here. 
Firstly Clause 606 is limited to suspension during takeovers and 
therefore cannot really be said to limit the power of suspension 
generally. Secondly this interpretation of Clause 606 specifically 
contradicts Clause 108, which explicitly says no reason need be 
given. Finally it is appropriate to note that the Exchange need 
only believe that a breach of the code has been committed. ' The weak 
language of Clause 606 does not really warrant Barker J.'s interpre-
tation of the effect of the Clause. 
Barker J. however concludes that: 34 
"Ordinary principles of fairness must apply and 
militate against such an arbitrary approach." 
Alternatively he held that if the power exercised stems from 
contract, a term must be implied into the Listing Contract that, 
provided the listed company carries out its obligations under the 
Listing Agreement and the Listing Manual, the Defendant will not 
arbitrarily withdraw the Listing. In support of this conclusion 
Barker J. offers no authority beyond Section 4(i) (b) of the Share-
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brokers Amendment Act which states that a function of the Exchange 
is to specify conditions and terms of the listing. It is argued 
that the word "conditions" implies that if the conditions are 
fulfilled, listing will be granted and sustained. 
f-bwever this interpretation conflicts with Rule 12.02, which states 
no reason need be assigned when refusing or suspending listing, and 
Clauses 107 and 108 of the Usting Manual. Clause 107 reads: 
"107. Companies which conform to the conditions set 
out in this Manual may be considered for 
official listing but are not entitled to listing 
by reason of such conformity." 
Clause 107 forms part of the contract formed by the execution of the 
Usting Agreement and would count against the implication of such a 
term. 
The only further support given by Barker J. for the limitation of 
the power to suspend is that the consequences of delisting lean 
heavily in support of such an interpretation. No authority is cited 
for limiting such an explicitly drafted power or implying into a 
contract a limitation on what is a very clear term. 
It should be remembered that as a preliminary point to the judgment 
Barker J. said that factors of commercial consideration, public 
interest and proposed reform would be ignored in the judgment. 
Indeed at page 31 of the judgment he said: 35 
"Vague allegations of the "spirit" of the Rules do not 
provide any reliable basis for interpretation of a 
contract or of secondary legislation." 
The Court of Appeal made no direct statement on the Exchange's power 
of suspension. f-bwever by implication the argument of the Exchange 
has been accepted. Since the relationship between the Exchange and 
the listed companies is based solely on a contract which was held to 
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be enforceable and is unlikely to be reviewed for Administrative Law 
reasons, as is discussed in the following section, the Exchange' s 
power of suspension would appear to be unfettered. 
E. Questions of Administrative Law 
What justifications can therefore be found for placing such limita-
tions upon the power of suspension? Before the Court of Appeal it 
was argued by the Second Defendant (amicae curia in place of 
N.Z.F.P.) that such a limitation could be implied by administrative 
law. 
If the exercise of the power can be regarded as the exercise of a 
statutory power of decision conferred by Rule 12.02, the imposition 
of a term that the Exchange will not withdraw a listing arbitrarily, 
by administrative law, is relatively straight forward. f-bwever if 
the power is limited to a term of the contract the matter becomes 
somewhat more complex. 
If the power of suspension exercised stems from Rule 12.02 the 
decision to suspend is a statutory power of decision. An applica-
tion can be made for a review of the decision under Section 3 of the 
Judicature Amendment Act 1972. The Court may then hold that an 
absolute discretion is unfair or unreasonable and imply a require-
ment that the Exchange may not arbitrarily withdraw a listing. 
It was however held by the Court of Appeal that the Exchange's power 
of suspension was based entirely on their contract with the listed 
company and that the Exchange in fact had no power to make rules 
governing their relationship with listed companies. How such limits 
can be implied into the Exchange's contract with the listed company 
becomes a difficult question. 
The first argument raised was that the Exchange has a public law 
responsibility to avoid acting arbitrarily in relation to the 
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exercise of its right of suspension. It was argued that in the end 
such a right has its origins in statute by reason of the statutory 
power given to the Exchange to enter into contracts, therefore 
action taken to suspend or cancel a listing might be made the 
subject of judicial review. The Court of Appeal decision in Webster 
v. Auckland Harbour Board36 is said to support this argument. At 
page 650 of that case Cooke J. said: 37 
"Undoubtedly a public body which has, as here, lawfully 
entered into a contract is bound by it and has the same 
powers under it as any other contracting party. But in 
exercising the contractual power it may also be 
restricted by its public law responsibilities. The 
result may be that a decision taken by the public body 
cannot be treated as purely in the realm of contract; 
it may be at the same time a decision governed to some 
extent by statute. 
The Court of Appeal did not adopt this argument in the Exchange' s 
case. It held that, whether a statutory body with local authority 
responsibilities or not, the question must still depend on whether 
that conduct falls within any one of the carefully defined and 
limited categories specified in the Judicature Amendment Act 1972. 
Any wider approach could never have been intended by Parliament. 
Otherwise any corporate body recognised by statute or owing its 
existence to a specific or general statute could have all its 
commercial operations subject to constant judicial review. 
In the Exchange' s case the Court of Appeal found two matters which 
put the Exchange' s power beyond review. The first turns upon the 
character of the act involved when the Exchange enters into a 
Listing Contract. It may not follow by any means that such a step 
in itself amounts to the exercise of a statutory power even though 
it is clearly the exercise of a statutory function. 
The second matter concerns the exercise by the Exchange of the power 
of suspension. The Court held that it was the exercise of a right 
given by the contract and thus clearly outside the scope of the 
exercise of any power under the statute; at best it could be 
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described as one step removed from the exercise of a statutory 
power. Only the latter step is the subject of challenge in the 
proceedings and is too remote to be classed as a statutory power of 
decision. 
An interesting combination of sources of "Statutory Power of 
Decision" was also argued before the Court of Appeal by the First 
Defendant, the Listed Companies Association. It was argued that 
because of the reference to Rule 12.02 in Clause 3 of the Listing 
Agreement, Rule 12.02 was imported to the Listing Agreement and any 
exercise of the power in Clause 3 was in effect an exercise of Rule 
12.02. In this way the exercise of the contractual power was in 
effect an exercise of a statutory power of decision. From this it 
was contended that, where under statutory power of decision, reasons 
are given by the decider it is always open for the Courts to review 
that decision as to the correctness of those reasons. 
This argument was however quickly dispensed with by the Court. It 
was held that the relationship between the Exchange and a listed 
company is in contract alone. The purpose of Rule 12.02 was to 
enforce any suspension in the Exchange's domestic relations with its 
members. For this reason the reference to the power of suspension 
is made in Rule 12. 02 but this does not lead to a conclusion that 
the relationship between the Exchange and listed companies takes on 
a statutory complexion. 
As a residual argument before the Court of Appeal it was suggested 
that judicial review . of the delisting might be available without 
recourse to the Judicature Amendment Act but on a wider approach to 
administrative law. Wade in Administrative Law says: 38 
"Powers of public authorities are essentially 
different from those of private persons . . . (A person) 
may act out of malice or a spirit of revenge, but in 
law this does not affect his exercise of his power. In 
the same way a private person has an absolute power to 
release a debtor or, where law permits, to evict a 
tenant regardless of his motives. This is unfettered 
discretion. But a public authority may do neither 
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unless it acts reasonably and in good faith upon lawful 
and relevant grounds of public interest. Unfettered 
discretion is wholly inappropriate to a public author-
ity which possesses powers solely in order that it may 
use them for the public good." 
It is suggested that public bodies may never have truly unfettered 
powers. 39 That this extends to exercises of contractual power by 
public authorities is accepted in cannock Grace District Council v. 
Kelly. 40 In this case it was accepted that review went beyond bad 
faith and capriciousness and extended to the Westbury41 grounds 
that an impermissible consideration had been taken into account or 
some mandatory considerations had been missed. It was also sugges-
ted in Cannock that the proper ground of relief may have been 
certiorari. 
Two matters are raised when applying this type of review to the 
Exchange. First there is the question of scope of any review. 
Presumably if the action is open to review on Westbury grounds it is 
also reviewable on grounds of lack of natural justice. Through 
natural justice it might quite easily be held that the absolute 
power be limited by implication of a term that listing not be 
arbitrarily withdrawn. 
The second matter concerns the scope of the term "statutory body". 
At its widest this would include all bodies incorporated under 
statute. f-bwever this must for obvious reasons be limited to bodies 
which are statutory monopolies, for example the Post Office. Even 
this however would have absurd results for every commercial contract 
of a body such as the Dairy Board would be open to judicial review. 
In the Exchange's case it would seem that it falls outside this area 
of review. The contract in question is a commercial contract of 
service with the listed company. There would have to be serious 
reasons before such a contract should be disturbed. 
unlikely that the Courts power of review extends this far. 
It seems 
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This question of review outside the Judicature Amendment Act was 
left undecided by the Court of Appeal as it was not comprehended 
within the questions raised for consideration. 
F. Status of the Manual 
If however the power of suspension requires a breach of a condition 
before it can be invoked, as was held by Barker J. , the question 
arises whether Clause 612 was a valid condition. Whether or not a 
breach of the Takeover Code allows the Exchange to suspend a listed 
company depends upon the status of the 1981 edition of the Listing 
Manual. N.Z.F .P. argued that the Takeover Code was not a valid 
condition because it was either an invalid Rule of the Exchange or 
it was not part of the Listing Agreement executed with the Exchange. 
(1) The Manual as Regulations: 
As regards the code being invalid as a regulation it was submitted 
to the High Court that the Takeover Code, and therefore presumably 
the whole Listing Manual, constituted rules of the Exchange and as 
such were not made in compliance with Section 7(3) of the Sharebro-
kers Amendment Act, which requires approval of 
in Council and publication in the Gazette. 
question Barker J. began by holding that the 
the Governor-General 
In approaching this 
legislation clearly 
contemplated that listing, delisting and suspension be covered by 
rules of the Exchange. This conclusion was based upon the observa-
tion that Section 4(b) of the Act required the Exchange to promote 
and specify the conditions and terms for the listing and trading of 
securities on the Exchange. This he held was a statutory function 
of the Exchange and when read alongside the power to make rules for 
the conduct of business on the Exchange, concluded that rules could, 
and in fact should, be made dealing with listing requirements and 
specifically takeover practices. 
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Further Section 3(3)(f) provides that companies will be "listed for 
the time being" which Barker J. interpreted as meaning that listing 
will be continued until some new arrangement is made. In the 
judgment he holds that in enacting the new legislation Parliament 
contemplated a new regime for listing, delisting and suspension of 
listing. 
or both. 
This new regime was to consist of rules, fresh contracts 
It is not clear whether the argument that the Exchange in 
fact had no power to make rules as regarding listing was argued 
before the High Court, however Barker J. is clearly of the opinion 
that the Exchange not only has the power to make such rules but is 
required by the new legislation to do so. 
Barker J. goes on to identify two reasons why the Takeover Code is 
invalid as Rules of the Exchange. Firstly, since the rules go 
beyond the general law governing takeovers, they must therefore be 
rules for the conduct of business on the Exchange and as such are 
required to be made in accordance with Section 7(3). Since none of 
the Listing Manual has been approved or gazetted is is therefore 
invalid. 
Secondly Rule 12.01, which was made in accordance with Section 7(3), 
purports to delegate the power to make regulations concerning 
listing to the Executive. Barker J. considers this to be an 
unauthorised delegation of the Exchange' s rule making power to its 
executive and on normal principles of administrative law, those 
parts of the listing requirements purporting to delegate matters of 
principle, such as general listing requirements, to the Executive 
are invalid. Matters of administrative detail, it was held, could 
be delegated. Rule 8.08 which allows the Executive to make regula-
tions governing incidental matters of detail or administrative 
machinery relating to matters provided for in the rules is therefore 
unaffected. 1-bwever matters such as the Takeover Code were consi-
dered to be far from administrative detail. Authority for this 
conclusion on unauthorised delegation was found in Hawkes Bay Raw 
Milk Company Limited v. f\ew Zealand Milk Board.
42 Barker J. 
states in summary that: 43 
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"General Listing requirements must be rules for the 
conduct of ordinary trading on the Stock Exchange. 
These requirements should have been included, at least 
in general terms, in the gazetted rules ... Moreover, 
rules which purport to delegate to the Executive 
listing requirements when such listing requirements 
should have been made by means of the Rules, must be an 
improper delegation." 
The whole conclusion stems however from the finding that it was a 
role of the Exchange to make rules as to the conditions of listing. 
This question was taken to the Court of Appeal in order to establish 
that the Exchange was not only not required to make such rules but 
in fact had no power to make such rules. 
(2) The Court of Appeal Decision on Questions 1 and 2: 
The Court of Appeal approached the question from a completely 
different perspective. It was held that the new legislation did not 
intend to change the method in which listing conditions were made. 
The Act was only concerned with the conduct of activities of the 
Exchange and its members and not on the whole concerned with the 
conduct or activities of listed companies. This is supported by the 
long title to the parent Act which reads: 
"An Act to consolidate certain enactments of the 
General Assembly relating to sharebrokers and Stock 
Exchanges." 
The aim of the Amendment Act is consolidation of the Stock Exchange 
- sharebroker relationship rather than amendment of the relationship 
between the Exchange and listed companies. 
To support its eventual conclusion that the Act neither requires nor 
enables statutory rules ' to be made by the Exchange the Court of 
Appeal considered the meaning and purpose of Sections 4 and 7 of the 
Act. rt was submitted by the Second Defendant that the conditions 
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of listing must be made as Rules of the Exchange because they are a 
matter relating to "the conduct of business" on the Exchange. The 
Court however pointed out that the thrust of the two sections is 
different. Section 4 is concerned with the functions of the 
Exchange whereas Section 7 is directed much more narrowly to its 
rule-making powers. It would be wrong to extend the ordinary and 
natural meaning of the rule-making authority to include all the 
functions of the Exchange. It is noted that although the various 
specific provisions of Section 7(2) are not intended to provide an 
exhaustive table of the matters which are to become the subject of 
rules, there is nothing among them which is even remotely concerned 
with controlling the conduct of listed companies or their busines-
ses. Each i tern is in fact related. only to internal management by, 
and the affairs of, the Exchange. 
Further this is emphasised by the fact that Section 7(4) provides 
that the rules shall be "binding on the members of the Exchange". 
Nothing is said about listed companies or any other outside organi-
sation. 
Finally the language of Section 4(1) (b) is contrasted against the 
language of Section 4(l)(c). Section 4(l)(b) requires that the 
Exchange "regulate and promote uniformity in the conduct of its 
members and of business of its members". This is imported directly 
into Section 7 (2) where paragraph (b) requires rules dealing with 
"the terms and conditions on which a member may operate". 
In contrast paragraphs (b) and (d) of Section 4(1) omit any refer-
ence to regulation. The respective functions are "to promote and 
specify" or "to promote". Though it was argued by the Second 
Defendant that "promote" could include in its meaning regulation the 
Court considered that this was language
44 "entirely appropriate to 
the incorporation of conditions and terms of listing in contracts of 
adhesion". The deliberate use of the word "specify" in fact implies 
that some power other than the power to regulate under Section 7 is 
to be used. Section 5 provides the necessary mechanism for that 
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power, by providing ways in which the Exchange may enter into 
contracts. 
The argument adopted by Barker J. that Section 3(3)(f), in providing 
that securities will continue to be listed for the time being, 
implies that a change is to take place in the method of specifying 
listing conditions, is explained as only providing a transition 
period. No implication of new regulations is raised. 
With the decision that listing conditions cannot be made by regula-
tion the only remaining conclusion is that listing requirements are 
a matter to be specified by contract. 
(3) The Manual as a Contract: 
The question that remains therefore is whether the Manual is a valid 
contract with listed companies. 
A number of Australian cases have dealt with the question of whether 
a Stock Exchange and a listed company have between them a binding 
contract which gives legal effect to the listing requirements. 
45 
The cases have held that such a contract exists between the listed 
company and the Exchange, which arises on acceptance of a listing. 
N.Z.F .P. had a contract executed in 1976, with the Stock Exchange 
Association. This agreement, which incorporated the Listing Manual 
in its 1976 form, was silent on the matter of takeovers. The 
benefit of all contracts with the Association devolved upon the New 
Zealand Stock Exchange under Section 3(3)(b) of the 1981 Act. 
In the Designbuild v. Endeavour46 case however the form of listing 
agreement was not explicit as to terms, and the Court felt it must 
ascertain the contents of the contract by inferring terms implied by 
the contracting parties. The Court was only prepared to imply terms 
necessary in order to give business efficacy to the relationship 
between the parties, the obligation to observe the listing require-
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ments was not such a term. However two factors distinguished this 
case. Firstly N. Z. F. P. expressly agreed in their Listing Agreement 
to be bound to the Listing Manual. 
Secondly in Oesignbuild implying a binding obligation to obey the 
listing requirements was not considered necessary because the Sydney 
Stock Exchange had absolute discretion to suspend or delist which 
was felt to be a greater sanction than binding a listed company to 
obey the Listing Manual. 
In Howard Smith v. Ampol Petroleum Limited A the Privy Council 
affirmed the earlier decision of Street L.J. which recognised the 
contractual force of the Stock Exchange's listing requirements. It 
is therefore clear that listing requirements can, and in this case 
would, bind a listed company in contract. 
The important question that remains is whether N.Z.F.P. is bound by 
the Takeover Code of the Listing Manual, inserted after execution of 
their Listing Agreement. Clause l(b) of the Listing Agreement reads: 
"(1) The Company will for so long as the Exchange 
continues to grant the Company the right of 
quotation on its Official List; 
(b) Comply with the relevant requirements and condi-
tions of Official Listing as from time to time set 
out in the Exchange's Listing Manual." 
This clause would appear to provide the Exchange with a unilateral 
right of variation whereby the company is required to comply with 
any amendments the Exchange may make. This intention would seem to 
be borne out by Clause 3 of the agreement which requires the listed 
company on variation of the listing requirements by the Exchange to 
inform their shareholders of the variation and if the Articles of 
the company require amendment, put such amendments to the sharehol-
ders. If such amendments are not approved the Exchange may, at its 
discretion, remove the company from the Official List. This is a 
pretty broad power and seems to envisage fairly sweeping powers of 
variation. 
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Barker J. however did not accept such a wide power of variation. It 
was held that the power of variation only extended as far as 
additions and variations within the reasonable contemplation of the 
parties at the time the agreement was 
supported with the case of Hole 
authority ·. 49 
exercised. This conclusion is 
v. Garnsey48 and subsequent 
Having accepted this limitation on the variation clause Barker J. 
went on to hold that the changes made by the Takeover Code were 
outside the reasonable contemplation of N.Z.F.P. when the agreement 
was executed. It was held that when N.Z.F.P. executed this agree-
ment it was entitled to assume that the only restrictions and 
requirements concerning takeovers were those found in the legisla-
tion and it was not in their contemplation that the Exchange would 
use the open-ended power in the contract to make new terms, which 
would have the effect of restricting statutory rights, without at 
least the implied assent of N.Z.F .P. For these reasons Barker J. 
concluded that the Takeover Code was not binding on N.Z.F.P. because 
it was not part of their contract with the Exchange. 
The Hole v. Garnsey line of authority is however not as easily 
applied to this case as may at first be thought. This line of 
authority applies to a specialised fact situation. Hole v. Garnsey 
concerned an alteration of the rules of a registered industrial and 
provident society. The alteration was made not by a variation 
clause but by a resolution of the members, and required members of 
the society to subscribe for additional shares. The resolution was 
held not to bind members who neither voted for the resolution nor 
otherwise assented to it. Lord Tomlin clearly said that
50 "the 
power of amendment must be limited to amendments reasonably consi-
dered to be within the contemplation of the parties at the time the 
contract was made, having regard to the nature and circumstances of 
the contract". It is the last part of this statement which must be 
remembered. 
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This decision was followed by Ostler J. in New Zealand Fruit Growers 
Federation Limited v. Registrar of Building where Ostler J. said:
51 
"It is clear from the decision of the House of Lords in 
Hole v. Garnsey that as against dissentient members the 
power of amendment of the rules must be confined to 
such amendments as can reasonably be considered to have 
been within the contemplation of those members when 
they joined the Society." (emphasis added) 
Again the case was limited to amendment of the rules of a society 
against members of that society. 
In the case of Eltham Dairy Co-Operative v. Johnson Meyers C.J. said 
of Hole v. Garnsey: 52 
"It will be observed that the Learned Lord is referring 
only to alterations in the constitution of the company 
and not to matters of contract apart from what may be 
regarded as the constitution of the company." 
This case again concerned the relationship between a body and 
members of that body. 
In the most recent case of Black, White and Grey Cabs Limited v. 
Reid53 the doctrine was applied by the Court of Appeal in 1984. 
However once again the case concerned the relationship between a 
member of a body and a variation of the rules of that body. 
In all the cases in which Hole v. Garnsey has been applied prev i-
ously the contract has been of a very different nature. The 
contracts have involved the relationship between a member and an 
organisation. The contracts have been of an ongoing institutional 
nature, the type of contract under which the member acquires a 
significant right, for example the right to income, which he or she 
expects to keep. 
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In the case of the listing contract the situation is very differ-
ent. Firstly, the contract contains unilateral rights of termina-
tion for both parties. Rule 12.02 which is imported to the Listing 
Manual provides a right for the company to cancel the right of 
quotation. This right is equal to the right of the Stock Exchange 
in Rule 12. 02 to suspend or cancel the contract. The contract is 
not therefore of an ongoing nature as it can be terminated at any 
time by either party. The contract is in fact merely a contract of 
adhesion for the performance of a service. All the agreement 
provides is that as long as the listed company pays the fees 
required and observes the conditions requested of it, the Exchange 
will list the company on its Official List. The listed company does 
not become a member of the Exchange, contributes no capital and 
acquires no rights of management, as did the Plaintiffs in the Hole 
v. Garnsey case. 
It was therefore submitted to the Court of Appeal that the "reason-
able contemplation" limitation is merely a term to be implied into 
certain types of contract where protection of a valuable interest is 
required. 
(4) The Court of Appeal's Decision on Questions 3 and 4: 
The judgment of the Court of Appeal accepted this limitation on the 
application of the Hole v. Garnsey doctrine. The Court held that 
the qualification which was read into the right of variation is not 
something which will follow as a matter of course. Whether or not 
it is read in will depend upon whether or not such a qualification 
can be implied as a necessary term. This is supported by the 
Court's judgment in Black, White and Grey Cabs Limited v. Reid where 
Richardson J. said: 54 
"Whether or not a regulation subsequently laid down by 
one party is within the powers of amendment under the 
provision must be determined having regard to the 
surrounding circumstances including the relationship of 
the parties and the nature and object of the agreement." 
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The Court interpreted this as meaning that such an implication will 
not arise almost automatically. It will depend upon the very 
contract under consideration, construed within its own particular 
environment. 
In the case of the Listing Manual it was found not to be possible to 
make such an implication. The Court said:
55 
"In the present case it may be that no thought was 
given by anybody to the possible introduction into the 
Listing Manual of requirements concerning takeover 
bids. l'bnetheless the provisions of the contract which 
anticipate general changes in the listing requirements 
are clear and entirely free of any ambiguity. Nor is 
it possible to spell out of the contract as a whole an 
implied term which would justify a qualification upon 
those provisions of a kind accepted in Hole v. Garnsey." 
It was held that, in the light of the Exchange's continuing respon-
sibility to promote the interests of both its members and the public 
at large, the contents of the Listing Manual could not possibly 
remain static in a changing commercial and economic climate. The 
functions of the Exchange could only be effectively performed by the 
introduction of new provisions to meet changing conditions and any 
qualification limiting the power of variation might well defeat 
important purposes of the listing requirements system. 
It was further pointed out that it was not a matter of interfering 
with the affairs of individual companies but of maintaining a fair 
market in the interests of everybody for the buying and selling of 
securities. This wider function of the Exchange would be stultified 
if it were impossible to vary listing requirements without the 
concurrence of individual companies. 
The importance of the ability to take immediate action demanded by 
business pressures is also noted. Absurd results could follow if 
some companies were free to challenge a change with others willing 
to acquiesce. One of the main benefits of making listing require-
ments by contract rather than by regulation is to allow greater 
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flexibility and avoid delays involved in approval and gazetting of 
rules. 
Finally the Court notes that the Listing Agreement was not for any 
fixed term. An end could be put to it at any time either by the 
Exchange or by the listed company. 
The Court therefore concludes that the Listing Manual requires that 
each listing, so long as it has the right of quotation on the 
Official List, will comply with contemporary listing requirements. 
Any limitation of the right of variation would inevitably defeat the 
purpose of listing requirements. Any limitation on the power of 
variation cannot therefore be implied into the Listing Agreement. 
The Court of Appeal was not asked, and of course it became unneces-
sary, to go on and decide whether the Takeover Code was outside the 
reasonable contemplation of the parties. f-bwever it is submitted 
that for much the same reasons as advanced by the Court for not 
implying limitations on the right of variation, the variation 
actually made was within the reasonable contemplation of the 
parties. The very nature and purpose of the contract must make it 
contemplatable that substantial changes could be made, even changes 
which go beyond the general law on the subject. 
Further the introduction of , some takeover control must have been in 
the minds of the parties. As will be discussed later, by 1978 most 
overseas jurisdictions had adopted or were planning controls of the 
type adopted in Clause 612. The London City Code
56 had adopted 
Rule 27(4) on which Clause 612 was based. In Australia the Stock 
Exchanges had placed provisions governing the conduct of takeovers 
in their Listing Manuals. The Australian Associated Stock 
Exchange's listing requirements contain Clause 3R(9)(b) which is 
similar in intention to Clause 612 of the Exchange's Takeover Code. 
The f\ew York Stock Exchange also had a similar requirement. It 
therefore must have been within the contemplation of a company the 
size of N.Z.F .P., which is in fact listed on Australian Exchanges, 
G. 
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that some requirements concerning takeover conduct, perhaps of the 
very type introduced by Clause 612, would be likely to be added to 
the listing requirements. 
The result of the Court of Appeal's decision is therefore that the 
Usting Manual forms a binding contract between the Stock Exchange 
and the listed company and that contractual relationship was in no 
way qualified by the provisions of the 1981 Act. This contract 
contains a unilateral power of cancellation for both parties to the 
contract and a unilateral power of variation for the Stock 
Exchange. The nature and purposes of the contract do not allow the 
implication of a term limiting the power of variation as was implied 
in I-tile v. Garnsey. 
The Role of the Stock Exchange 
One interesting aspect of both the High Court and Court of Appeal 
decisions in this case is how far Courts will go to imply terms into 
perfectly clearly worded clauses of contracts. Both the Exchange's 
power of suspension and the power of variation were clearly worded 
in the listing agreement. Barker J. found it necessary to imply 
terms into both these powers, finding a principle of law to control 
both these open-ended powers. Barker J. 's decision seems to be 
based on a desire to control the Exchange' s powers to contract and 
regulate. The one issue that seems to underlie the whole case and 
explain Barker J.'s decision is the exact role of the Exchange. Two 
possible views of the Exchange seem to appear from the judgments. 
Firstly, the view which tended to be adopted by Barker J., that the 
Exchange was a statutory monopoly which should be controlled in the 
same way as other public bodies. The Exchange is viewed as having 
powers beyond its own members extending it into a controlling body 
of the security market. Thus its primary methods of control would 
be through regulation, which could extend beyond controlling its 
members to affect members of the public and public companies. 
Barker J.'s whole judgment seems to be based upon such an interpre-
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tation of the Exchange' s role which he concludes is introduced by 
the 1981 Act. 
The second view appoints the Exchange a more limited role. The 
Court of Appeal is more reluctant to impose controls on the Exchange 
and seems to be adopting the view that the Exchange is merely an 
incorporated society of sharebrokers. As such, the Exchange should 
be free to make contracts for the supply of its services (i.e. 
Official Listing) in whatever terms it and it's clients (i.e. the 
listed companies) think fit. The Exchange' s power of regulation 
therefore has been limited to its relationship with its members and 
its domestic operations. The Court of Appeal's interpretations of 
the 1981 Act, that it is concerned primarily with consolidating the 
law relating to the activities of the Exchange and its members, 
reflects this view of the role of the Exchange. This latter view is 
the more traditional role of the Exchange~ In his judgment Barker 
J. says: 57 
"[ T]he Legislature seemed in the legislation to take 
the subject of listing away from the realm of pure 
contract and require the formation of rules on listing 
... [T]he specifying of conditions and terms of listing 
was made a statutory function and the Defendant was 
required to make rules governing the conduct of 
business on the Exchange. The Legislature indicated 
that delisting was something to be provided for in the 
rules rather than by mere contract." 
This conclusion not only implies that the entire Listing Manual may 
be invalid in its present form and must be re-drafted as rules of 
the Exchange but also implies that the Exchange has the power to 
regulate beyond its domestic affairs, a power which was given to the 
Exchange by the 1981 Act. It follows from this that the intention 
of the 1981 Act was to replace the existing Association with a new 
"Exchange" which would have a statutory authority to make rules and 
regulations for the Exchange. The result of this is that the 
Exchange becomes a quasi-governmental body rather than the self-
regulating incorporated body which it was prior to the Act. 
- 40 -
When the implications of Barker J.'s judgment are outlined it 
becomes obvious why the Exchange so energetically argued that they 
had no power to make "rules" which had effect beyond their own 
member constituents. For example listing requirements, which affect 
listed companies who are not members of the Exchange but clients of 
the Exchange. The Exchange' s motivation therefore went beyond a 
desire to prove the validity of the Listing Manual or the Takeover 
Code. 
If Barker J. 's judgment had stood unchallenged the Exchange would no 
doubt have had to seek some statutory clarification of their role 
and the intended effect of the 1981 Act. 
The judgment of the Court of Appeal does clarify the Exchange' s 
position. The Court says: 58 
More generally it may be said as well that except 
indirectly the 1981 Act when taken as a whole is not 
concerned with the conduct or activities of listed 
companies. It is concerned with the activities of the 
Exchange and its members. Finally, the general purpose 
of the 1981 Amendment is simply to support the corpor-
ate and domestic purposes expressed in the long title 
of the parent Act which reads - "An Act to consolidate 
certain enactments of the General Assembly relating to 
sharebrokers and Stock Exchanges"." 
Together with the conclusion that the Exchange cannot make rules 
relating to its relationship with listed companies the Court of 
Appeal's interpretation of the 1981 Act has reaffirmed the more 
traditional role of the Exchange. 
The result is therefore that the Exchange is required as the 
self-regulating body of sharebrokers incorporated by statute with 
powers of regulation no greater than any other incorporated soci-
ety. All functions beyond those relating to the regulation of 
conduct of its members are to be achieved by methods available to 
any incorporated body, notably the power to contract with other 
parties. 
H. 
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It is submitted that this is the proper interpretation of the 
Exchange' s role. This is the role of Stock Exchanges in overseas 
jurisdictions, notably in Australia where Exchanges are body 
corporates incorporated under companies legislation and are not 
created by statute. This conclusion also makes the 1981 Act more 
understandable. It is easier to accept that the 1981 Act intended 
merely an administrative tidy-up, to do away with the previous 
duplication of bodies, rather than to introduce a new type of 
quasi-governmental exchange. The exact role that the Exchange 
should play in the control of takeover conduct will be dealt with 
later in this paper. 
Interpretation of Clause 612 
The second half of Barker J. 's judgment deals with the interpreta-
tion of Clause 612. Strictly it was not at all necessary for him to 
deal with this point. If the submissions of the Exchange were 
accepted, the Exchange had a contractual right to suspend arbitrar-
ily and so the interpretation of Clause 612 was unnecessary. 
1-bwever if the submissions of N.Z.F.P. were accepted, as they were, 
the Takeover Code was void and the interpretation again becomes 
irrelevant. Barker J. however went on to deal with the party's 
submissions on this point. The question of interpretation of Clause 
612 was not taken to the Court of Appeal because once the N.Z.F.P. 
offer had been withdrawn, the situation could be remedied by 
re-drafting Clause 612 as re-executing the Listing Agreements with 
the listed companies. 
(1) All Shareholders Treated Equally: 
The first submission of N.Z.F.P. was that the clause did not have 
the effect of prohibiting a "discriminatory" offer. The Court uses 
the term "partial offer" but the term "partial offer" refers only to 
the fact that less than the entire shareholding of the target 
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company was sought. The Exchange has never sought to limit partial 
offers when the offer is made to all shareholders and acceptances 
are pro-rated. "Discriminatory" is a better term for the situation 
in this case, where offers were made to only 41% of the shareholders 
and acceptances to be accepted in ful1. 5
9 
N.Z.F.P. claimed therefore that Clause 612 did not restrict them 
from excluding any given shareholder or group of shareholders from 
the ambit of the offer. It was argued that all Clause 612 required 
was that all shareholders of a class, to whom offers had been made, 
must be offered the same consideration. This restricted interpreta-
tion was contested by the Exchange who claimed that the clause 
clearly meant that all shareholders of the same class must receive 
equal treatment and this would not be achieved if some shareholders 
were excluded altogether from the offer. Such an interpretation, it 
was submitted by the Exchange, accords with the principles of 
fairness inherent in the Takeover Code. The clause in full reads: 
"612. All shareholders of the same class shall be 
treated similarly by the offeror except that the 
allotments of less than a marketable parcel of 
shares may be satisfied by cash. The amount 
shall be stated in the offer documents." 
It seems quite clear that the aim of the clause was to stop the very 
practice which took place in this case. The Exchange, who drafted 
the rule, the press and the Securities Commission
60 clearly 
thought N. Z. F. P. was in breach of the clause. Though this is not, 
because of among other reasons, the contra proferentem rule 6
1, any 
guide to the Court's interpretation of the clause, it does demon-
strate the intention behind the clause. The clause has its origins 
in Rule 27(4) of the London City Code which has the effect Clause 
612 was intended to have by the Exchange. 
62 Rule 27 ( 4) requires 
the offeror to make the offer to all shareholders and then pro-rate 
acceptances back to the percentage level that it desires. Clause 
612 is however hardly the equivalent of Rule 27(4), at best it 
enumerates a somewhat similar principle, however it fails to provide 
the means to achieve it. 
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In dealing with the interpretation of Clause 612 the Court rejected 
the contention that the Exchange's principles of fairness, inherent 
in the Takeover Code, must be borne in mind. Barker J. refers to 
the Mul tiplex63 case and concludes that the desire for fairness 
may not be a valid aid to interpretation. Though, he says he has 
sympathy with the stated objects of the Exchange in trying to 
protect minority shareholders, this object will not effect the 
interpretation of the clause. 
An interesting contrast to this approach is found in the Australian 
case of Kwikasair Industries Umited v. Sydney Stock Exchange 
Limited. 64 In this case Kwikasair was suspended from the Official 
Ust because the activities of the company were not being carried on 
within the spirit of the rules of the Stock Exchange. In refusing 
to overturn the decision of the Stock Exchange Street C.J. said:
65 
"The Stock Exchange is not only entitled but it is 
bound to be vitally concerned with the maintaining of a 
fair market for the buying and selling of securities 
paramount and predominant amongst all [of its] 
objects is: 
'(b) To promote and protect the interests of all 
members of the public having dealings on 
the Sydney Stock Exchange or with members 
of the Sydney Stock Exchange. ' " 
It should be noted that Section 4(d) lays down the objects of the 
New Zealand Stock Exchange as: 
"(d) To promote the interests of its members and 
members of the public in relation to the 
listing, trading, underwriting and marke-
ting of securities." 
There is obvious similarity of purpose between the two Exchanges. 
Street C.J. goes on: 6
6 
"Moreover, so long as the Stock Exchange continues in 
this community to discharge with the acquiescence of 
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the legislature the important public duty expressed in 
its paramount and predominant object (Clause 6) the 
members of its committee should be left free to 
exercise honestly their powers of entry on or removal 
from the Official Ust unencumbered by any prospect of 
their having to face a litigious investigation of the 
correctness of their decisions. The powers of the 
Committee in this regard are arbitrary; they are 
intended to be exercised summarily and fearlessly in 
protecting the public interest." 
This shows a somewhat different approach to the Exchange than the 
approach adopted by Barker J. who held that though he could see the 
force of the Exchange' s intepretation, when one considers what it 
wishes to achieve, the words it chose do not necessarily achieve 
this object. They are at best he says equivocal. In the absence of 
any more express prohibition against this type of offer, the clause 
must be interpreted in the light of the existing legal rights of the 
offeror, in particular the 1963 Companies Amendment Act which 
permits this type of offer. 
Barker J. finds support for N.Z.F.P.'s interpretation of the clause 
in the latter part of the clause which excepts allotments of less 
than a marketable parcel from the clause and allows these to be made 
up in cash. · This, he says, shows that consideration for the offer 
was in the mind of the draftsman. Likewise the reference to amount. 
Though a logical approach has been taken to the problem, I doubt 
that Barker J. has reached the best result. The Court again seems 
to be unable to accept that the Takeover Code was intended to go 
beyond the limitations of the much criticised 1963 Act, although the 
foreword to the Manual states that the listing requirements are 
"additional and complementary to the companies statutory obliga-
tions". It is admitted that the clause is ambiguous and badly 
drafted, however it is submitted that the same account should be 
taken of the obvious intention and purpose of the Exchange to fulfil 
its public interest functions. The clause was obviously intended to 
go beyond the obligations of the 1963 Act, as other sections of the 
Code in fact do. 67 The final conclusion is I submit that the 
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Exchange has been the victim of thoughtless drafting, though Barker 
J. 's approach does seem to be over-restrictive. This approach 
however may be explained by Barker J. 's interpretation of the status 
of listing requirements as Rules of the Exchange rather than as 
terms of a contract adhesion. 
(2) The Class of Shareholders 
The final submission for N.Z.F.P. was that the Goodman Group 
constituted a different class from all the other Wattie sharehol-
ders. This rather practical definition of the term "class" was 
supported by affidavits from Sir Lewis Ross, former chairman of 
N.Z.F.P. and David A. Clark, an independent holder of company 
directorships. The basic thrust of these affidavits was that 
Goodman, by virtue of their 30% holding, had effective control of 
Wattie. This controlling block of shares, from a commercial point 
of view, places Goodman in a different category to the other 
shareholders, who are primarily investors. Further Goodman's 
expected return from the takeover would be somewhat higher as they 
would expect the consideration to reflect some of the premium for 
control which their shares represented. In short Goodman's interest 
was somewhat different to the interests of the other shareholders. 
The affidavits also noted the undesirable effects involved for 
N.Z.F.P. if the offer were extended to Goodman's. 
N. Z. F. P. 's interpretation of the word "class" is also supported by 
the authority of Re Hellenic and General Trust Limited
68 which, 
though in an entirely different context, deals with the definition 
of "class". In this case, approval was sought for a scheme by way 
of a takeover under the equivalent of Section 205 of the Companies 
Act. The Court was asked to decide whether the shares held in the 
company which was the subject of the arrangement (Hellenic) by a 
subsidiary (M.I.T.) of the company proposing the arrangement 
(Hambros) were in the same "class" as those of the other ordinary 
shareholders in Hellenic. The shares held by the subsidiary were of 
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the same kind as the others. t-bwever it was held they were in a 
different class because M.I.T. had substantially different interests 
to the other shareholders. In reaching this conclusion Templeman J. 
applied the dicta of Bowen L.J. in Sovereign Life Assurance Company 
Limited v. Dodd where he said:
69 
"It seems plain that we must give such meaning to the 
term "class" as will prevent the section being so 
worked as to result in confiscation and injustice and 
that it must be confined to those persons whose rights 
are not so dissimilar as to make it impossible for them 
to consult together with a view to their common 
interest." 
It seems from this that the word "class" can be defined to promote 
the intention of the section in which it is used. For Clause 612 
N. Z. F. P. sought a very practical and · commercial definition which 
would recognise the realities of the situation. 
Barker J., however, found this definition too wide. The subjective 
investigation into the rights and expectations of a particular 
shareholder as distinct from one of his rights under the articles of 
. t d . 1 . 70 company, was reJec e . He says 1n cone us1on: 
"I am not inclined to the view that the word "class" in 
the context of Clause 612 means more than differentia-
tion according to the company's constitution; e.g. 
preference shares as contrasted with ordinary shares. 
The ascertainment of "class" is to be governed by the 
Articles of Association." 
In the context in which the word "class" is used here, the listing 
and transfer of shares, it is submitted that Barker J.'s conclusion 
must be correct. The word "class" is used in Clause 612 in a very 
different context and purpose to the use of the word in Section 205 
and as such requires a stricter definition to do justice to the 
clause. 
The wider more practical and commercial definition would however 
have provided a useful solution to the problem raised in this case. 
I. 
J . 
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The wider definition may be of some use later when discussing 
proposals for takeover legislation. 
Suspension as a Sanction 
One final point that Barker J. raises in his judgment, that may be 
of interest, are his comments on the suitability of suspension as a 
sanction. He is of the opinion that suspension is an inappropriate 
sanction because the people who are most likely to suffer are the 
numerous innocent shareholders who will not be able to trade upon 
the open market. Barker J. felt that the delay in implementing the 
suspension, which was supposed to allow the small shareholders time 
to trade, only exacerbated this -problem. The threat of suspension 
must inevitably depress the market with the result that some of 
those for whom the Exchange professed concern might have to sell at 
less than true market value. 
The Exchange's reply to this criticism was that the power of 
cancellation or suspension is the only sanction the Exchange has 
against any company which breaches the provisions of t he Listing 
Manual. The Exchange felt that it must be prepared to exercise the 
power in order to secure a well-informed and orderly market. 
Barker J, however concludes that this comes close to an acknowledge-
ment by the Exchange that the present statutory and regulatory 
provisions and its current listing arrangements are less than 
satisfactory, a view which he shares. What alternatives there are 
to suspension by the Exchange will be looked at later in this paper. 
The Effect of the Listing Agreement on Subsidiary Companies 
One point which was not raised by the High Court and was not 
proceeded upon by the Court of Appeal was the question of whether 
the subsidiaries of listed companies were bound by the terms of the 
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listing. This point it is submitted is of crucial importance to 
this case since both N.Z.F.P. and Wattie-Goodman acted through 
subsidiary companies, who had not executed a listing agreement and 
therefore could not possibly be bound by the Takeover Code. 
Adopting a strict approach to corporate personality N. Z. F. P. have 
not committed a breach of the Takeover Code because the offer was in 
fact made by N.Z.F.P. Investments Limited, an unlisted company. 
This of course seriously limits the scope of the Takeover Code. 
Most major takeovers are made by using subsidiary companies, for 
example Dominion Industries, was used to acquire the Wattie-Goodman 
interest in N.Z.F .P. Therefore unless the takeover conduct of an 
unlisted subsidiary can in some way be disciplined against the 
listed parent company the Takeover Code becomes useless as a method 
of controlling takeover conduct. 
There are three ways in which parent companies may be disciplined 
for the actions of their unlisted subsidiaries. Firstly if it is 
accepted that the Exchange' s power of suspension is, as a term of 
the listing contract, unlimited and arbitrary, there is no problem 
which legal entity commits the breach, as no breach is required to 
be proved. 
Secondly, even if the power must be exercised on proper grounds, 
grounds are provided by Clause 606 of the Listing Manual. One 
possible interpretation of this clause, which reads: 
"606. Where the shares of either the offeror or 
offeree company are listed, Exchanges will 
normally continue quotations during the currency 
of the offer except that the Exchange may 
suspend quotations if it belives that: 
* 
* 
* 
a false market exists; or 
a breach of this code has been commit-
ted; or 
There is non-compliance with require-
ments of the Listing Manual ( including 
"Spread")." (emphasis added) 
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is that to justify suspension by this clause the breach of the code 
need not be made by the listed company at all, the only requirement 
is that the Exchange believes that a breach of the code has taken 
place. However some nexus would need to be present. It would 
probably be sufficient to show that the subsidiary was acting at the 
direction of the parent company and not for itself. It need not 
however be the same legal entity who breaches the Code as is 
suspended. 
The third possibility involves the question of corporate identity. 
It is recognised that the veil of corporate identity will be lifted 
for groups of companies for certain purposes. Group accounting is 
one area in which the entire group of companies will be treated as 
one entity, there are several other areas of the Companies Act which 
do the same. 71 This lifting of the veil is however limited. For 
example in the case where one subsidiary is insolvent while the 
group as a whole is financially healthy, creditors of the subsidiary 
have no recourse against the group. There are however cases where 
the Courts have been willing to treat a subsidiary company as an 
agent of the holding company. 72 Examples of this arise in The 
Roberta 73 , where a parent company has been held liable on a bill 
of lading on behalf of a wholly owned subsidiary, and Smith, Stone 
and Knight v. Birmingham Corporation 74 , where a parent company was 
entitled to compensation on the compulsory acquisition of land owned 
by a wholly owned subsidiary. In the latter case Atkinson J. 
75 
concluded that while it was a question of fact in each case whether 
the subsidairy was carrying on the parent company's business or its 
own, six points were relevant in determining this question: 
(1) Were the profits treated as those of the parent company? 
(2) Were the persons conducting the business appointed by 
the parent company? 
(3) Was the parent company the head and brain of the 
trading venture? 
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(4) Did the parent company govern the adventure and decide 
what should be done and what capital should be embarked 
on it? 
(5) Were the profits made by its skill and direction? 
(6) Was the parent company in effectual and constant 
control? 
In the case of N.Z.F.P. and its subsidiary N.Z.F.P. Investments all 
the above criteria surely apply. With the further fact, which will 
apply in all subsidiary lead takeover situations, that the holding 
company supplied all the capital and enterprise for the venture, the 
Court is highly likely, if they adopt the Smith, Stone and Knight 
approach, to hold that the subsidiary is merely acting as the agent 
of the holding company. The holding company would therefore be 
responsible for the takeover conduct of the unlisted subsidiary and 
accountable for any breach. 
4. 
A. 
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POLICY ANO REFORM 
The Exchange as a Takeover Control Body 
N.Z.F.P. 's attempted takeover also raises interesting questions 
about the state of controls over takeover conduct generally. Though 
the Court of Appeal did hold that listed companies were bound by the 
Exchange's Takeover Code, which presumably will be amended to 
accurately reflect the Exchange's intention, the controls over 
takeover conduct are far from satisfactory. 
Control exercised by the Stock Exchange is unsatisfactory for a 
number of reasons. These being the unsuitability of suspension as a 
sanction, the scope of the Exchange, and the role of the Exchange 
generally. 
Firstly as was shown in the N.Z.F.P. case that the Exchange is very 
limited as to the sanctions available to it. The only sanctions 
available are suspension or de listing, both of which are particu-
larly unsuitable for takeover control. As was pointed out by Barker 
J. 76 in his judgment. The effect of suspension is usually to do 
the most harm to the small shareholders who lose the ability to deal 
on the market and will be unable to deal with the knowledge of a 
"market price". 
Though an undesirable inconvenience suspension does little to 
directly effect the delinquent company. In this case, though 
N.Z.F.P. would have been suspended, this would not have stopped the 
takeover. Wattie shares could continue being exchanged off the 
market, even by members of the Exchange, as Mr Lynn Papps pointed 
out on the day the suspension was announced. 77 The Exchange's 
suspension had no effect on N.Z.F.P. 's takeover offer at all. 
Further N.Z.F.P.'s suspension would in no way have stopped N.Z.F.P. 
from increasing the holding in Wattie by "on market" buying. 
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Suspension only had the indirect effect in this case of making 
N.Z.F.P. shares less attractive as consideration for the offer. Few 
of Wattie's small shareholders would want to accept as consideration 
shares which could not be traded on the Exchange. If the offer had 
been a cash offer there would naturally be no such effect. Suspen-
sion therefore in most cases only poses an indirect inconvenience to 
the delinquent company rather than effectively controlling their 
conduct. 
An alternative is to suspend the offeree company. This however is 
somewhat unfair on the offeree company's minor shareholders. At 
least when the offerer company is suspended the minor shareholders 
bear the detriment of their own board's actions and some indirect 
censure may be exercised by the aggrieved shareholders in the next 
general meeting. If the offeree company is suspended then the 
shareholders adversely affected have no connection with the wrong 
doing. Further the takeover can still proceed off the market and 
competitive buying to defend the target company would be stopped. 
The action would only further advance the takeover by removing 
securities from the market at the very time that competition on the 
market should be encouraged. 
Suspension is therefore rather a "blunt instrument" as far as 
sanctions go. The Exchange does in fact have an alternative 
sanction which would have had a more direct influence in this case. 
Rule 16.04 of the Rules of the Stock Exchange provides:
78 
"16. 04 The Council may by resolution, notify regional 
exchanges forbidding business on any terms by 
all members with a particular person, firm or 
company or in some particular share, stock or 
debentures, should they deem such an action to 
be in the interests of the investing public, the 
interests of or standing of the Exchange or its 
members, or for such other reason as they may 
consider to be relevant." 
This power would have been more effective in this case, as the 
Exchange could have forbidden any member of the Exchange from 
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dealing with N.Z.F .P. or their shares. No member could thereore 
have been involved in the selling of Wattie shares to N.Z.F.P. or 
the transfer of N.Z.F.P. shares in consideration. This however 
would not stop the takeover completely, it merely stops any member 
of the Exchange from being involved in the transaction. Transfers 
can still take place directly between N.Z.F.P. and Wattie sharehol-
ders. It should however be noted that for a company to have this 
rule applied against them they need not be a listed company. 
The scope and effect of Rule 16.04 however may be limited by the 
Courts. This is a rule of the Stock Exchange and as such would be 
open to administrative review, however the aggrieved company may 
have trouble proving standing. A member of the Stock Exchange could 
however object to the exercise of the rule. The power is somewhat 
arbitrary and drastic and it is doubted that the Exchange would 
readily use it. Another point to note is that the Clause 16.04 
power is expressly reserved to the Council by resolution and the 
power can only be exercised by the Council and not by the Executive 
of the Exchange. 
A further alternative to suspension as a sanction for breach of the 
Exchange' s Takeover Code has been adopted in Australia. Section 
42(2) of the Securities Industry Act 1980 declares that a body 
corporate is under an obligation to comply with the listing rules of 
the Exchange. This means that rather than suspend the errant 
company, the Exchange can seek a Court Order to enforce compliance, 
due to this statutory obligation. This however is only applicable 
to listed companies. 
The second reason that the Stock Exchange is an unsatisfactory body 
for controlling takeover conduct is that the Exchange is limited to 
controlling takeovers made by listed companies only. Unlisted 
companies are not bound in contract by the Takeover Code and the 
Exchange has no power to make regulations covering either listed or 
unlisted companies. Even though most takeovers are made by listed 
companies, or their subsidiaries, this remains a serious limita-
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tion. There is always the possibility that the Code can be avoided 
with the use of unlisted nominee companies. Further the only 
takeovers and substantial acquisitions which come to the attention 
of the Exchange are those of other listed companies by virtue of 
Section 5 of the Companies Amendment Act 1968. The takeover of an 
unlisted company could take place without the attention of the 
Exchange. 
Finally it is questionable whether the Stock Exchange is the proper 
body to be regulating the securities market. In essence the Stock 
Exchange is an incorporated body with power to regulate only its 
members. Though the Exchange should be interested in maintaining a 
fair market during a takeover, it is doubted that it is an adequate 
body to leave the primary control of takeover conduct with. It may 
be interesting to remember the classic statement of Lord Buckmaster 
in Weinberger v. Inglis: 79 
"The London Stock Exchange is in reality a building 
vested in certain proprietors and used for the purpose 
of carrying on a market for stocks and shares. It is 
not regulated in any way by charter or statute. The 
management owes no duties to the public and the 
business is subject to no regulations except those 
which, from time to time, (the Council) think right to 
impose on those whom they choose to admit. The 
prestige and authority of the institution depend 
entirely upon the reputation it has established for 
honest and efficient business methods. Any group of 
people who so desired could start another Stock 
Exchange tomorrow. It is not a public market, it is a 
private market and access to it is obtained through 
membership." 
Though no longer strictly true of the New Zealand Stock Exchange, 
this does reflect the traditional role of the Exchange and its 
position in the business world. The Exchange remains a private body 
whose primary concern is the conduct of its members and the conduct 
of business on the Exchange. In the light of this and the limi ta-
tions on the Exchange as a takeover control body, it is submitted 
that the Exchange is not the ideal body for this role. This view 
was shared by the Securities Commission in their review
80 of 
B. 
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takeover law, where they suggested that rules of the kind set out in 
the Takeover Code should be translated into rules of law so that 
ordinary sanctions for rules of law will be available. 
The Present Legislative Controls 
Apart from the Takeover Code the only other controls on takeover 
conduct are provided by the Companies Act 1955 (which includes the 
provisions of the 1963 Companies Amendment Act). There are however 
a number of rules which do affect the securities market. Firstly 
there are rules, whose object it is to regulate the markets for and 
dealings in goods and services, other than securities, and impact 
upon securities law for better attainment of that main object. 
These rules are principally contained in Part III of the· Commerce 
Act 1975. 
Then there are rules whose main object is to implement national 
policies relating to overseas investment and they impact upon 
securities law in furtherance of that object. This body of law is 
found in the Overseas Investment Act 1973 and regulations under that 
Act. 
Until 1963 legislation dealing with takeovers tended to be made for 
a particular situation rather than as part of a scheme. 
The following are examples of this type of legislation: 
Sections 191-194: 
Section 62: 
Procedure for disclosure of 
payments to directors for loss of 
office. 
Prohibition on a company financing 
purchases of its own shares. 
Section 208: 
Sections 205-207: 
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Compulsory acquisition of remaining 
shareholding when 90% is already 
held. 
On reconstruction and merger as an 
alternative to a takeover. 
In contrast to this legislating for specific circumstances, a 
legislative scheme to regulate takeover activity was introduced in 
1963 in the Companies Amendment Act 1963. However over the last 
twenty years the inadequacies of the statute have been realised and 
exploited with the result that most transfers in control now take 
place outside the scope of the Act. 
The N.Z.F .P. offer for Wattie shares was a "takeover offer" for the 
purposes of the 1963 Act and all the requirements of the Act were 
fulfilled. The pre-a ff er purchasing of 24. 9% percent by N. Z. F. P. 
was not a "takeover offer" because the offers were made by standing 
in the market and were not, as will be explained later, inside the 
scope of the Act. 
In 1983, the Securities Commission completed a review of the law and 
practice governing takeover activity.
81 Also at present the 
Securities Commission is investigating the N.Z.F.P./Wattie-Goodman 
saga. It is expected that this should provide a useful test for a 
number of aspects of the Commission's report, as well as being an 
interesting test of the Commission's investigative powers. 
6 
The scheme of the 19~3 Act is that when an offeror wishes to advance 
their holding beyond 20 percent of the voting power of a company 
certain information, as prescribed in the Schedules, must be passed 
between the offeror, the target company's directors and the offer-
ees. Directors are required to disclose their intentions as regards 
their shares and recommend action for the offerees. Strangely 
enough there is no requirement to disclose the Director's future 
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employment with the offerer's company or the target company, while 
under Sections 191-194 of the Companies Act, they are required to 
disclose payments for loss of employment. 
The criticism of the Act is not however that its scheme is ineffec-
tive but that its scope is too limited for it to have any practical 
effect. The major problem lies in Section 2 in the definition of a 
"Takeover Offer" which introduces two limitations on the scope of 
the Act. This definition reads: 
"Means an offer in writing for the acquisition of 
shares under a takeover scheme." 
The first limitation arises from the decision in the Multiplex 
Industries82 case where it was held that an oral offer is not 
included in the definition. The Court of Appeal rejected the 
argument that Section 2 was exhaustive and limited the Act to 
written offers only. This opened the gate for many oral takeovers. 
The Tatra Industries Limited v. Scott Group Limited
83 took this 
one step wider holding that "writing" only referred to writing 
between the offerer and offeree and did not include written notice 
to the Stock Exchange. 
The second limitation arises from the words "under a takeover 
scheme". A takeover scheme was held in an Australian case on 
similar legislation to be84 "A plan or purpose which is coherent 
and has some unity of conception". "Takeover scheme" was further 
limited in the Carter l-b1t85 case to a scheme of written offers 
only. Any preceding oral offers are not to be included in the 
scheme and added toward the 20 percent limit. This "coherent plan" 
test of a scheme was found by the Securities Commission
86 to be 
difficult and in the three investigations undertaken by the Commis-
sion87, it was found to be impossible to determine whether, and if 
so when, a scheme came into being. Written offers which do not fall 
inside a "scheme" are therefore also outside the application of the 
Act. 
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It should be noted that both the Commerce Act 1975 and the Overseas 
Investment Act 1973 apply to both written and oral offers. 
Further problems are raised by Section 3(b) of the Act which 
provides that the Act does not apply in respect of any scheme 
involving the making of offers for the acquisition of "any shares in 
any company, if offers are made to not more than six members of that 
company". This exception allows a person to obtain control of a 
company by purchasing the shares of a major shareholder without the 
, necessity of complying with the Act. A combination of factors, 
among them the increased size of institutional shareholdings,
88 
the greater willingess of institutions to trade actively in these 
holdings and the fact in some cases effective control may be passed 
by a parcel as small as 10 percent, has meant that a large number of 
transactions which ought to be classified as company takeovers are 
exempt from the 1963 Act. 
Compliance with the 1963 Act therefore becomes optional depending on 
the form rather than the substance of the takeover bid. This is 
clearly an unsatisfactory situation and needs reform. The Securi-
ties Commission reached this conclusion and recommended the repeal 
of the Act and replacement with new provisions in the Securities 
Act. 89 
There is also some doubt about the exact effect of non-compliance on 
the validity of the offer. Section 13 provides for penal ties for 
non-compliance. However nothing is said about the validity of the 
offer. It has been assumed by the Courts
90 that only serious 
non-compliance invalidates an offer. However it is still unclear 
exactly where the line is to be drawn. 
The Securities Commission went on to recommend reforms to the law 
affecting company takeovers. These recommendations not only widen 
the scope of the law with the effect that the 1963 Act's require-
ments apply to many more takeovers, but introduce new requirements 
designed to further achieve the objects of a takeover law. In the 
c. 
- 59 -
remainder of this paper it is proposed to look at the recommenda-
tions of the Commission for reform and apply these to the N.Z.F.P. 
offer. rbwever before examining these reforms it is necessary to 
examine what the objectives of and reasons for a takeover law are. 
The Reasons for Regulation 
The case for legislative regulation of takeovers as an aspect of 
securities law, is based on two sets of arguments: 
(1) That legislation is necessary to protect the fundamen-
tal premise of securities law that securities ranking 
pari passu should entitle the holders as nearly as may 
be to equal treatment; and 
(2) That legislation is necessary to protect and promote 
the efficiency and integrity of the capital market. 
It is accepted that takeovers are not themselves bad. They encour-
age more efficient utilisation of capital and resources. Further 
the threat of a company takeover encourages more efficient manage-
ment and stimulates innovation. The aim of a takeover law therefore 
should not be to reduce the number of takeovers but to promote a 
more competitive and balanced market for control. 
The first set of arguments are based on legal propositions derived 
from the nature of a share. These legal reasons usually receive the 
most prominence, however there are strong economic arguments, in 
favour of regulation, which are probably more important and compel-
ling. The legal proposition is open to question since it is based 
on the assumption that a share . in a large shareholding should be 
treated equally with a share in a small shareholding. The validity 
of this legal principle may be open to question in the light of the 
fact that shares in a large shareholding have an element of control 
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attached. In reality not all shares can be treated equally for all 
purposes. 
The second set of arguments are based on economic principles and the 
unbalanced nature of the market for control. They draw attention to 
the public interest in the mechanisms of capital markets as a means 
of guiding economic activity, stimulating innovation, minimising 
resource waste and satisfying needs at a competitive cost. 
It is recognised by the Jenkins Committee
91 that there is a market 
for control of a company just as there is a market for investment in 
its shares. Problems arise when control is sold on a market 
designed for the trading of minority parcels. The Exchange does not 
provide an adequate market structure for the situation were there 
are relatively few buyers, who need time to prepare, and no organi-
sed group of sellers. Problems also arise because investment share 
prices are based on expected returns whereas a control price is 
based on asset-backing and potential for re-organisation and there 
is no structure for prices to adjust from one basis to the other. 
Asset values are commonly inflated beyond the share value. 
92 Thus 
assets can be obtained well below their true value. Further, in the 
market for control, the product is large and complex and some 
preparation is required before entering into competition. The 
investment share market cannot provide the structure for this and it 
is therefore rare that a competitive price is reached. 
The aim of legislation should therefore be to provide efficient 
competition to ensure that a premium over market value is paid. 
This was the idea behind the 1963 legislation. 
93 However take-
overs are still being achieved by pre-emptive or sudden tactics and 
selective off-market trading, thus avoiding a competitive market for 
control. 
o. 
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Costs and Benefits of Regulation 
In their report the Securities Commission highlight a number of 
costs and benefits of regulations and conclude that intervention is 
a positive and beneficial step. The main benefits of regulation are 
seen to be: 
(1) Promotion of Confidence in the Market 
In an unregulated market the stockholders who receive 
the most benefit from a takeover are usually large 
parcel holders since from their holding control can be 
assembled more rapidly. This the report argues is the 
reason for the declining role played by individual 
investors and consequently the loss of ability to raise 
new equity capital for companies. Also a move away 
from small investment reduces the number of transac-
tions and weakens the price formation process of the 
market. 
If an uncompetitive price is paid there is a shift of 
benefit from vendor to purchaser and if a premium is 
paid for large holdings there is a shift of benefits 
away from smaller investors. Since, in the last decade 
there has been a shift towards buying for capital 
growth this is an important consideration. 
It is also argued that in a sale of control it is the 
assets and goodwill which are being sold and so 
shareholders should share pro-rata the proceeds as they 
do with a surplus on the winding-up of a company. This 
analogy however is open to question since in a transfer 
of control, much more than assets and goodwill affect 
the valuation. The potential for re-organisation and 
control of the assets also affects the value of control 
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and this is a value which attaches only to those shares 
from which control can be effectively assembled. 
A more competitive market, it is concluded, would 
promote the availability of equity capital by inducing 
business confidence. 
(2) Effects on Investment Decisions 
This effect works in two ways: 
(i) An active market facilitates the issue of 
shares for cash to finance investment and 
maintains a balance against corporate 
borrowing; and 
(ii) It is argued that by reducing the discount 
at which assets can be required by 
takeover, the investment in new capital 
assets will be stimulated. This however 
is doubtful as a takeover does much more 
than pass assets. It passes instant 
know-how and goodwill and eliminates 
existing competition. It is doubtful that 
many potential offerors would easily be 
encouraged to move from capital investment 
to full-scale enterprise. 
(3) Allocation of Resources 
It is argued that allocation is best made by perfect 
market conditions, which channels resources to their 
most profitable use. However, the application of this 
to a market for control need not follow. The most 
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effective allocation would surely be to the most astute 
and financially strongest offeror. This offeror, it is 
submitted, will usually be the first to succeed in a 
"first come, first served" unregulated market. 
The disadvantages that the Commission sees are: 
(1) Loss of Freedom 
(2) 
The Commission approaches this as a fundamental 
consideration. However, this must be balanced against 
the loss of freedom experienced by small investors who 
are under-paid or completely forgotten on the present 
"free" market. 
Potential for Reducing the Incidence of Takeovers 
This would seem to be the most important disadvantage 
of regulation. A takeover generally moves under-
producing assets to more productive management, which 
eventually must economically benefit the whole 
economy. A reduction in takeovers would therefore 
cause a general economic loss. 
However, the Commission argues that, though a rise to a 
competitive price will discourage takeovers, the 
effects of competition will be to introduce more 
bidders. Further, where a takeover is discouraged by a 
competitive market it may be more economic to leave 
control where it is. 
The Commission concludes that there will be a slight 
reduction in the number of takeovers but those discour-
aged will have little effect on industry structure. 
E. 
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The proof of this is the fact that in overseas juris-
dictions there has been no appreciable decline in 
takeover activity after regulation. 
(3) Administrative Costs 
These are not expected to be great as no additional 
administrators are required and sanctions are designed 
so that the people using the law enforce it. 
Proposed Reforms 
The Commission supports a move away from the approach based on 
offers. It finds the definition of "Takeover Offer" too difficult 
and moves towards a scheme based on the acquisition of "relevant 
interests". This ties in with a previously suggested register of 
"relevant interests". The essence of the register is that anyone 
who acquires a relevant interest of over 5 percent of the voting 
securities of a listed public company should be required to disclose 
that fact and the price at which the interest was acquired. 
Disclosure is to be made to the Stock Exchange and the target 
company. Thereafter the person should be required to report any 
acquisition or disposition of l percent or more until his/her 
holding falls below 5 percent. The definition of "relevant inter-
est" is wide and complicated and includes nominee voting agreements 
and conditional agreements to acquire. Because the 5 percent is 
substantially below the 20 percent level the nominee legislation 
would act as an early warning system, for the market, of a prospec-
tive takeover. Disclosure of the price paid would also ensure equal 
prices for small parcel holders. 
This legislation which was first suggested in the Commission's 
report on nominee shareholdings in public companies, would, as the 
Commission accepts create an informed but not necessarily competi-
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tive market. The suggested replacement to the 1963 Act is also 
based upon the acquisition of "relevant interests" and uses the same 
defintion. 94 
In the Wattie-N.Z.F.P. situation this nominee legislation would 
certainly have had an effect. Assuming they amounted to ·~elevant 
interests", which will be discussed later, all parties would have 
been required to disclose their interests when they were obtained. 
This may have done much to defuse the situation. If the exact 
Wattie-Goodman holding in N.Z.F .P. had been clear N.Z.F .P. may not 
have launched the defensive buying which led to the takeover offer. 
Further N.Z.F .P. would have become aware of the Brierley-Goodman 
moves much sooner and may have withdrawn their offer sooner. 
Similary Goodman would have known the level of acceptances to the 
N.Z.F.P. offer and may not have embarked upon the costly defensive 
move. Altogether it is submitted that disclosure as envisaged by 
the Commission would have resulted in a more rational and informed 
approach from all parties and thus saved considerable amounts of 
shareholder's funds. 
The important question is however which holdings would be regarded 
as "relevant interests". The defintion of "relevant interest" is 
wide and complex. 95 N.Z.F.P. 's interest in Wattie was clearly a 
"relevant interest" by virtue of part (1) (b) and (c) because it had 
the power to exercise the voting rights and the power to dispose of 
the voting securities, despite the fact that the shares were in fact 
held by a subsidiary. Further (3) of the definition reads: 
"(3) A body corporate or other body shall be deemed 
to hold a relevant interest in respect of any 
voting security in which another body corporate 
that is related to that body corporate or other 
body holds a relevant interest". 
Though "related" is not defined, wholly owned subsidiaries would 
certainly be included. 
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Further acceptances to the N.Z.F.P. offer would have to be declared 
as they were received, since the definition extends to conditional 
agreements to acquire voting securities. 
Similarly, for the reasons above, Goodman's interest in Wattie and 
Wattie's interest in Goodman would have to be declared. 
Dominion Industries clearly held a relevant interest in the N.Z.F.P. 
shares they held. However Wattie and Goodman probably did not hold 
a declarable "relevant interest" in N.Z.F.P. Since both Wattie and 
Goodman held 50 percent of Dominion Industries both should be 
treated similarly. Neither party can be said to have direct control 
over the voting rights or acquisition and disposal of the shares 
held by Dominion Industries, since Dominion Industries was 
controlled by its own board with equal representation from Wattie 
and Goodman. Thus Wattie-Goodman do not hold a relevant interest in 
N. Z. F. P. by virtue of (1) (b) or (c) of the definition. Whether 
Wattie-Goodman hold a relevant interest therefore depends upon 
whether they are a "related" company to Dominion Industries. The 
definition leaves this question unclear, however Section 2(5) of the 
Companies Act97 defines "related company" as either: 
II (a) 
(b) 
(c) 
A subsidiary or holding company. 
A company in which more than 50 percent of the 
shares are held by the other company or by the 
members of that company. 
which the businesses of the 
been so carried on that the 
of each company is not readily 
Companies in 
companies have 
separate business 
indentifiable. 
Dominion Industries does not seem to come under this definition 
since 50 percent is held by both Wattie and Goodman and the busi-
nesses have not become unidentifiably intermixed. The logical 
result is that neither party holds a relevant interest in N.Z.F.P .. 
This would mean that Dominion would be required to make disclosure 
and comply with the requirements for any N.Z.F.P. shares it holds or 
acquires. If Wattie and Goodman were to hold "relevant interests", 
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both would have to comply with the requireme:its of the suggested 
legislation for every acquisition by Dominion Industries, thus 
producing a duplicate effect which would distort the true situation 
and defeat the purpose of the suggested legislation. The Wattie and 
Goodman interest in N.Z.F.P. however remains undisclosed which does 
seem to leave a gap in the scheme. 
The "relevant interest" approach was adopted from the Australian 
Companies (acquisition of shares) Act 1980, which applies, in its 
own right, in the Australian Capital Territory. The Act has also 
been adopted in each state with minor "translator" modifications. 
The "relevant interest" approach overcomes the problems experienced 
with the definition of "takeover offer" and "takeover scheme" by the 
1963 New Zealand legislation. 
The nominee legislation, while providing a more informed market, 
would not however result in a truly more competitive market. For 
example in the Wattie-N. Z. F .P. situation disclosure may have made 
the parties decisions more informed and disclosed the true situation 
but N.Z.F .P. would still have been free to go ahead and exclude 
Goodman from the offer. 
For this reason the Commission goes on to suggest replacement 
legislation for the 1963 Act. Firstly it is suggested that the 1963 
Act be repealed and replaced with new sections in the Securities 
Act. The new rules would prohibit the acquisition of a "relevant 
interest" in a voting security except in the following circumstan-
ces:-
(1) If immediately after the acquisition relevant interests 
are not in aggregate over 20 percent of the total 
voting securities of the issuer. The figure of 20 
percent being the point at which control is assumed to 
become an issue; 98 or 
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(2) By general offer to all holders of voting securities 
under a ·~akeover offer"; or 
(3) By means of an offer to the market to take all securi-
ties tendered under a "standing in the market" offer; or 
( 4) Where less than 3 percent of the total securities are 
acquired in six months; or 
(5) Where before acquisition the holder has 90 percent of 
the voting securities; or 
(6) By new subscription to all holders, pro-rata to their 
holdings; or 
(7) In accordance with the terms and conditions of an 
exception made by the Commission. 
exceptions is conferred on the 
proposed legislation. 99 
A power to make 
Commission by the 
Acquisitions may be made under any of the~e circumstances. Because 
of the prohibition approach acquisitions can be made once one of the 
circumstances is satisfied, notwithstanding the fact that the 
offeror may be outside another of the circumstances. For example if 
any offeror who holds 19 percent, acquires a further 3 percent and 
no other acquisitions have been made in the preceding six months, 
the offer is permissable under (4), regardless of the fact that 
immediately after the acquisition the acquirer is entitled to 
relevant interests in more than 20 percent of the voting securities. 
A "takeover offer" under the Act is required to be in writing and is 
required to be made to every security holder. There is no limita-
tion on the type of consideration except that identical considera-
tion must be offered for all securities and must not be less in 
value than consideration provided by the offerer in the preceding 
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three month period. The suggested nominee legislation would ensure 
compliance with this requirement, since prices paid for acquisitions 
over the 5 percent level must be disclosed. 
Partial offers are acceptable under a "takeover offer". However 
offers must be made to all holders of the desired security and where 
acceptances exceed the desired level they must be pro-rated so that 
all acceptors participate in the offer. Where a partial offer is 
made, a statement of offeror' s intentions in regard to the target 
company is required. It is hard to see why these statements of 
intention are required only in partial bids. The information would 
be equally relevant to shareholders when making the decision whether 
or not to remain with the company in an unlimited bid. 
An offer is also permitted to be conditional. Offers can therefore, 
still be made conditional on an stated minimum level of acceptance. 
All offers are to open for acceptance not earlier than 14 days after 
announcement and close not earlier than 21 days after opening. This 
provides a period of consideration for offeree's to avoid the 
stampeding of offerees to accept. Further this allows any parties 
who wish to compete in the market for control, time to formulate and 
announce counter offers. 
A "standing in the market" offer must similarly open 14 days after 
announcement and close 21 days later. The offer need only be 
announced in the Stock Exchange. Consideration must be in cash and 
any increased consideration must be paid to all acceptances. As 
with "takeover offers" consideration must be no less than the 
highest price paid during the three months preceding the announce-
ment. Partial offers would not be permitted and all shares tendered 
must be accepted. Offers must be unconditional and therefore 
acceptances will not be revocable. This means that any consent 
required under the Commerce Act must be obtained before the offer is 
commenced. 
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These "standing in the market" rules clearly cover the situation 
which arose in Tatra Industries Limited v. Scott Group Limited, lOO 
where a partial offer was made for 51 percent of the shareholding on 
a "first come first served" basis. The 1963 Act did not extend to 
this case because the written notice to the Stock Exchange, contain-
ing the offer, was held ·not to be an "offer in writing 11 •
101 With 
the new rules the sudden tactics employed in this case would not be 
permitted. Shareholders would have 14 days to consider the offer 
and would have available information required by the New Rules. 
Further the offer would have to remain open for 21 days and all 
shares tendered would have to be accepted. Off erees would not be 
stampeded into the offer in the fear that they would miss out if a 
hasty decision was not made. This would certainly provide a more 
balanced and rational marked for control and would allow competing 
offers to be organised. 
Under both of the above methods of making a takeover offer certain 
information must be made available. This is: 
(1) All information currently required by the 1963 Act. 
(2) The financial arrangements to secure funds for the 
offer. 
(3) Details of dealings which have taken place in the 
preceding three months. 
(4) In the case of a partial bid, a statement of the 
offeror's intentions in regard to the target company. 
(5) The offeror's intention in regard to the continued 
employment of the employees (and presumably the 
Directors). 
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This duty of disclosure goes hand in hand with the period of 
consideration, to allow shareholders and competitors to make an 
informed and unrushed decision. The aim being to allow a free 
market for control to develop. 
The disclosure of the financial arrangements to secure funds for the 
takeover will allow shareholders to better value the offer, particu-
larly where the consideration offered is, in part, shares in the 
offeree company. The N.Z.F .P. offer was eventually financed by a 
share issue. The $45.6 million required for the purchase of Wattie 
shares was subsequently re-financed by a ca_sh issue of N.Z.F .P. 
shares .102 This would certainly have affected the value of the 
consideration. The disclosure of financing arrangements will also 
highlight the situation where the takeover is to be financed · from 
the retained profits of the target company.
103 
Details of dealings which have taken place in the three preceding 
months will have already been made partially for listed companies by 
virtue of the suggested nominee disclosure requirements. This 
information will ensure that equal consideration is being offered 
and that the offeree has not made its initial buying at a higher 
consideration in order to ensure a strong position form which to 
launch the offer. 
The disclosure of the offeror's intention in regard to the continued 
employment of employees is important as this can influence sharehol-
ders decisions, especially in partial offers. Hopefully this 
diclosure will extend to directors and their future employment with 
~ 
the target company or the offeror company. The recommendations of 
directors carry considerable weight and what interest they have in 
the offer will be significant. In the Securities Commission's 
report on the City Realties takeover of Property Securities, concern 
was expressed about the fact that one of the directors of the target 
company had been offered the position of chairman with the offeror 
company. It is surely significant that an arrangement such as this 
be dislcosed when the directors make recommendations about the offer. 
F. 
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The only variations allowed to offers must be a change in considera-
tion and if this is a decrease it must be approved by the Commis-
sion, as must the withdrawal of an offer. 
!'-on-compliance with the Act gives rise to criminal liability except 
for inadvertent or immaterial breaches. The High Court also has a 
discretion spelt out to make orders prohibiting, delaying or 
increasing consideration of offers where provisions have not been 
complied with. The provisions of this discretion is a clear 
improvement over the ambiguous situation of the 1963 Act. 
One doubt about the rules is whether the full procedure is necessary 
for acquisitions between 75 and 90 percent of the shareholding. 
Once an offeror has acquired 75 percent of the shareholding they 
have the fullest possible control of the company. Surely the only 
remaining protection required in this area is that all shareholders 
be paid equal consideration. There seems little reason to require 
other protection. 
Application to N.Z.F.P.'s Offer 
The new rules require that all offers be made to all security 
holders. Partial offers are permitted but must be extended to all 
shareholders and acceptances must be pro-rated. N.Z.F.P . would 
therefore have been required to extend their offer to the Goodman 
shareholding in Wattie. In order to achieve their partial target 
N.Z.F .P. would have had to make the offer to all security holders 
and pro-rata their acceptances. An increase in Goodman's holding in 
N.Z.F.P. would therefore have been inevitable though depending upon 
acceptances from other Wattie shareholders, perhaps not enough to 
give Goodman a controlling interest in N.Z.F.P. A further reduction 
in the holding given to Goodman could be achieved by reducing the 
N.Z.F.P. share content of the consideration for the offer. However 
any increase in Goodman' s holding would have been unacceptable to 
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N.Z.F.P. The offer therefore would probably have been frustrated by 
the new rules. 
f-bwever it must be borne in mind that Goodman, the minority share-
holder, stood to lose a potential $120 million and a valuable 
position in the food industry if the N.Z.F.P. offer had gone ahead. 
Bearing in mind that one of the aims of a takeover law, as recog-
nised by the Securities Commission, 
104 is to maintain confidence 
in the securities market, this result does not appear unreasonable. 
If the takeover had gone ahead the type of loss envisaged would 
certainly affect confidence in the securities market. 
f-bwever it was argued that Goodman fell into a class of shareholder 
all of their own and all classes of shareholder cannot always be 
treated equally. It was argued that because extending the offer to 
Goodman would have resulted in an unfavourable result for N.Z.F.P.'s 
shareholding, and because Goodman' s interests varied markedly from 
other Wattie shareholders, it was unreasonable to expect the offer 
to be extended to all shareholders. 
It is difficult however to see that Goodman's interest did not 
require some protection. Though their interests are different from 
other minority shareholders, Goodman still has a valuable interest 
which requires protection. In any takeover situation there will be 
groups of sharedholders whose interests vary greatly, depending on 
many factors, one of which is the size of their shareholding. It is 
because of the mixed nature of shareholders and their interests that 
a takeover law is required in the first place. If all shareholders 
were in the same "class" and had the same interests there would be 
no reason to enforce equal treatment, as equal treatment would 
follow naturally. The fact that it is often more convenient or 
commercially expedient to make an offer to only a portion of the 
shareholders is the reason for the basic rule that all shareholders 
must be given an opportunity to participate in the offer. If it is 
unacceptable that N.Z.F.P. make an offer that, because of the nature 
of the consideration, results in giving the offeree effective 
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control of N.Z.F.P., then this surely means that the offer is 
unworkable. It is hard to understand the reasoning behind an 
argument which says that because it is commercially unacceptable to 
make a fair offer, a fair offer need not be made. If an offer which 
gives all shareholders a right of participation cannot be made then 
surely no offer should be allowed. 
P.n alternative to abandoning the offer altogether would have been 
for N.Z.F.P. to make a cash offer to Goodman only. To this effect 
it would be useful for the Securities Commission to have a power to 
dispense with the strict application of the rules and allow the 
Commission to make allowance for some of the harsher commercial 
realities of the situation. The offeror could be obliged to make a 
cash offer as an alternative. This has been contemplated as a 
solution by Mr Colin Patterson, Chairman of the Securities Commis-
sion .105 The Commission also contemplates a power of exemptions 
with terms and conditions to be prescribed by the Commission.
106 
Similar powers of dispensation have been contained in overseas 
legislative schemes. For example in England where the Panel 
administering the City Code is required to consent before any 
t . l ff can be made.
107 Th C · · ld th h t par 1a o er e omm1ss1on wou en ave o 
decide if the unfairness involved in offering a different type of 
consideration is justified by the difference of interests involved. 
If N.Z.F .P. had been unable to finance a cash offer, to at least 
Goodman, then the logical result would be that, if they cannot 
afford to make a fair offer, no offer should be made. 
The principle of equal opportunity for all shareholders is a major 
theme of overseas legislation. Principal 8 of the City Code 
requires that all shareholders be treated similarly by the offeror. 
The Australian Acquisition Code is based upon the same principle 
lOS as is the Ontario Code 109 
In New Zealand recent cases have highlighted the injustice which can 
occur when offers are not made to all shareholders. In the Durafort 
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Limited takeover of Auckland Intercontinental Properties different 
prices were paid to various offerees and in the City Realties 
Umited takeover of Property Securities Limited cash was paid to the 
initial offerees to secure control and subsequent offerees were paid 
in cash and shares. Both these cases were criticised by the 
Securities Commission. It seems that to fit with the philosophy 
behind the report, Goodman must be allowed the opportunity to 
participate in the offer. 
Under the proposed rules N.Z.F.P. would have been required to make a 
written offer to Goodman. N.Z.F.P. would have been able to acquire 
up to 20 percent of Wattie shares without any control. However once 
they passed a 5 percent holding in Wattie all acquisitions would 
have to be disclosed under the proposed nominee shareholding 
legislation. 
Once N.Z.F.P. reached a 20 percent holding in Wattie they would be 
required to make either a written offer to all shareholders, partial 
for the required level of shareholding and conditional on a minimum 
number of acceptances or an open offer by "standing in the market". 
To "stand in the market" the offer would have to be unlimited, 
unconditional and for cash consideration. 
In both cases the consideration offered must not be less in value 
than the highest price paid by N.Z.F.P. in the preceding three 
months. The likely effect of the proposed. rules would be that 
N.Z.F.P. would have abandoned their offer and limited their holding 
in Wattie to 20 percent of the shares. 
In their report the Securities Commission noted that perhaps the 
most compelling argument against a takeover law is that it might 
significantly reduce the number of takeovers. llO A reduction in 
the number of takeovers results in a loss of the benefits of 
industry rationalisation and restructuring and of increased manage-
ment efficiency which otherwise may have occurred. It was on this 
ground that the Commssion's suggestions were criticised by the 
- 76 -
Reserve Bank. 111 In their submissions to the Commission the 
Reserve Bank considered that the implementation of the Commission's 
proposal could well result in a significant and undesirable reduc-
tion in takeover activity. It was felt that both the 14 day 
consideration period and the requirement that all shares receive 
equal treatment by the offeror would discourage takeovers. This 
would certainly appear to be the result in the N. Z. F. P. takeover 
offer. f-bwever it is submitted that this is not necessarily true. 
The defensive tactics adopted by Goodman to protect their investment 
in Wattie eventually defeated N.Z.F.P.'s offer. The defensive 
buying undertaken by Brierley, on behalf of Goodman, resulted in a 
situation where N. Z. F. P. could not achieve their goal. The final 
result in an unregulated market was therefore exactly the same as 
the result under the suggested rules. This type of defensive tactic 
is discussed by the Commission in their report. 112 The Commission 
concludes that this "White Knight" competing purchasing will lead to 
a competitive content for control, if carried out with complete and 
full disclosure. This buying undoubtedly gives Goodman a "relevant 
interest" in the shares so purchased, at least for the period they 
were held by Brierley, because they have entered into an agreement 
or understanding by which they have a power to control the acquisi-
tion, disposal and presumably the voting rights of the shares .
113 
The suggested nominee legislation would therefore ensure disclosure 
took place, however since buying did not exceed the 20 percent level 
none of the formal requirements of the suggested takeover rules 
would apply. 
The only difference between the regulated and unregulated situation 
is therefore that in an unregulated market the unfair offer was 
defeated by the actions of the minority shareholder rather than by 
the operation of legislation. The cost to the shareholders of both 
N. Z. F. p. and Goodman would however have been less in a regulated 
market. The net result was that it cost N.Z.F.P. approximately $45 
million and Goodman $20 million to achieve a situation no different 
from the position which would have been achieved under the suggested 
- 77 -
rules. Both these sums were subsequently met by cash issues of 
shares in the respective companies, which would directly affect the 
value of shareholder's investments. The same result would therefore 
have been arrived at, with a substantial saving of shareholders' 
funds. 
This however would not be the situation where the minority sharehol-
ders who stand to be adversely affected, have neither the financial 
power nor the co-ordinated approach that was available to Goodman. 
A further factor which allowed Goodman to defend their position was 
the delay allowed by the Commerce Commission's consideration of the 
takeover. It is for cases where the minority shareholders do not 
have the financial power or co-ordination that takeover rules are 
required. The rules suggested by the Commission would protect all 
victims of unfair offers not just those with the financial power to 
protect themselves. 
Barker J. 's judgment was, prior to the Court of Appeal decision, 
applied in Baigent v. D. Mel. Wallace Limited. 
114 In this case a 
group of shareholders of D. Mel. Wallace Limited, who were mounting 
a takeover offer for 51 percent of the company, sought to restrain 
the company from selling its 50 percent share in a subsidiary 
company, Industrial Waste Collection Limited, to its partner in the 
subsidiary company, T. N. T. ( N. Z. ) Limited. It was found that the 
sole aim of the plaintiffs' takeover was to obtain control of the 
subsidiary. 
It was claimed by the plaintiffs that the sale was a breach of the 
director's obligation not to take measures which are designed to 
thwart a bona fide takeover offer without first giving the sharehol-
ders an opportunity to consider whether defensive measures should be 
taken. 
In his judgment, Prichard J. recognised the existence of such a 
duty. 1-bwever, despite the fact that the offer was not in breach of 
either the 1963 Companies Amendment Act or the Stock Exchange 
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Takeover Code, as interpreted by Barker J., 
115 it was held that, 
because the offer was not extended to all shareholders, the offer 
was not a bona fide takeover bid. The directors had therefore 
discharged their fiduciary duty to the majority of shareholders in 
protecting them against a "raid" which was plainly calculated to 
affect adversely the majority of shareholders of the company. 
Pritchard J. concluded: 116 
"The requirement that directors refrain from taking 
defensive measures in the face of an impending takeover 
bid applies only to a bona fide takeover offer: the 
requirement is so expressed in, for example, the Code 
of the City Working Party to which the plaintiffs have 
referred in support of their case. This is not a bona 
fide takeover bid." 
This case therefore preserves the right of the company to defend 
against unfair takeovers, even though they may not be in contraven-
tion of the existing takeover laws. Under the new rules suggested 
by the Commission an offer such as this would not have been 
allowed. Baigent would have been required to extend the offer to 
all shareholders as either a full offer "standing in the market" or 
as a pro-rated partial written offer. The result therefore again 
would have been the same. The case does however highlight the 
confused state of takeover law in New Zealand and supports the need 
for reform. 
It is therefore submitted that the Securities Commission is correct 
in its conclusion
117 that the only takeovers which will be 
discouraged are those which are marginal and in which general 
economic objectives may be best served by leaving the ownership of 
the resources unchanged until a bidder whose use of the resources 
will justify a competitive and fair offer enters the market. A 
distinction must be made between true economic gains and gains made 
at the expense of minority shareholders. As the Commission points 
out118 the suggested rules will create a more competitive market 
which will enable more bidders to participate in contests for 
control, thus achieving the above distinction. 
G. 
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Other Suggestions Not Adopted 
The Commission also considered a number of requirements obtained in 
overseas legislation which they did not recommend for adoption in 
l\ew Zealand. The English City Code119 has a requirement for 
mandatory offers. Where control of a company which is defined as 30 
percent of the shareholding, is acquired, a general offer, condi-
tional on the offeror raising his/her holding to 50 percent by the 
offer, must be made unless an exemption is granted by the 
Panei. 120 . The Ontario Securities Act has a similar provision 
where a takeover bid has been affected by a private agreement, which 
is exempt from the legislation . 121 The Commission did not suggest 
that either of these provisions should be adopted in New Zealand. 
Such a procedure would only be necessary where control is acquired 
without making offers to all security holders. Such a practice 
would be expensive and would undoubtedly discourage takeovers. 
Though the procedure would allow shareholders to quit a company in 
which control has changed hands the process is not really justified 
by the expense. Such offers would have to be cash offers to be 
effective. 
An equivalent procedure is already provided by Section 208(3) of the 
Companies Act, which gives the right to locked in minorities to 
compel purchase of their shares, where 90 percent is held by the 
majority. 
It should also be noted that under the City Code partial bids are 
prohibited unless the consent of the Panel is obtained.
122 
Consent is usually given only where below 30 percent of the shares 
are sought. In other cases a partial offer must be approved by 
shareholders. Once approval is obtained acceptances must be pro 
rated. 
It was noted by the Commission123 that the suggested rules could 
give defending directors or competing bidders the chance to 
frustrate the process of a takeover. The American Securities 
- 80 -
Exchange Act124 contains a general prohibition against the use of 
"fradulent, deceptive or manipulative acts or practices in connec-
tion with a takeover offer. 
This has been interpreted by the Federal Courts as applying to 
certain defensive tactics as well as to activities by the offeror. 
Similarly the Australian legislation
125 prohibits "bluffing 
offers". These are offers which the offeror cannot or will not 
complete but are designed to frustrate a market for control. The 
law in New Zealand does provide some protection against unfair 
126 defensive measures. rbwever serious consideration should be 
given to extended measures to avoid unfair defensive practices, 
otherwise the balance may shift unfairly against offerors. A 
general provision, such as that of the American legislation, may be 
a good idea. The Commission invited further comment on this issue. 
H. The Role of the Securities Commission 
The Commission's report raises questions about what role the 
Commission should play in the securities market. At present the 
Commission's principle role is to assist the reform of the law and 
practice in a general way. This is in sharp contrast to the role 
played by similar bodies in overseas jurisdictions. 
In Australia the National Companies and Securities Commission (the 
"N.S.C.S. ") has wide discretion in the application of securities 
regulations. The N.C.S.C. also has responsibility for all aspects 
of company registrations, 
company registries. One 
a power which is delegated to state 
of the most striking examples of the 
N.C.S.C.'s powers in the takeover area is the discretion to declare 
an acquisition to be "unacceptable", with the result that court 
orders may be obtained as if the acquisition had infringed the 
legislation .127 The Commission also has wide powers of investi-
gation.128 These powers enable the N.C.S.C. to intervene in the 
preparation and progress of a takeover. The Commission may act on 
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application of a person interested or on its own motion. The 
necessity that the N.c.s.c. act through the courts has been criti-
cised however on the grounds that it delays the N.C.S.C.'s power to 
act. 
In England the Panel has power of consent for partial offers
129 
and exempt offerors from requirements130 of the Code. The Panel 
also issues Practice Notes to regulate the market. 
131 Recently the Gower Report recommended changes to the adminis-
tration of English securities law. It was recommenced that all 
investor protection be consolidated in one act and all invitations 
to the public, whether distributions or takeovers, should be treated 
broadly along the same lines. One supervisory commission or 
department should be appointed to ensure compliance with require-
ments, with self-regulatory bodies, such as the Stock Exchange or 
the Panel, as subsidiary authorities. 
The Ontario Securities Commission has similar powers of exemption. 
The Commission also operates as a pre-takeover advisory body, has 
powers to issue cease trading orders and may apply to the Court for 
an order or compliance. 
In the United States the Securities Exchange Commission (the 
"S. E. C.") has a more limited role. They have the power to make 
regulations and investigate transactions to enforce the legislation 
and regulations. 
The Securities Commission report does not make any express recommen-
dations, about the role of the Commission. However since the 
Commission is to have the power to grant exemptions and consent to 
variations and withdrawals of offers it is implied that the Commis-
sion will adopt a more active role. The greater involvement by 
similar bodies overseas does have a beneficial effect on the 
legislation by giving flexibility to its implementation. It is 
submitted that the Securities Commission should be given full powers 
- 82 -
of investigation and power to bring actions on its own motion. This 
would extend protections to minority shareholders without financial 
or investigative powers, who are being unfairly treated. However to 
avoid administrative costs participants should be encouraged to 
enforce sanctions by their own actions, where it is possible. 
Further it seems desirable that the Commission have a power of 
dispensation from the requirements of the rules. In a case such as 
the N.Z.F.P.-Wattie takeover offer, it would certainly be beneficial 
if the Commission had the power to reach a comprise between extremes. 
Not all minorities will require the full protection of the rules and 
the Commission's power to consider the situation and require terms 
and conditions it thinks appropriate, by way of dispensation, 132 
would afford greater flexibility and fairness to the rules. 
The example afforded by the procedures under the Commerce Act should 
also be noted. The requirement that approval be obtained from the 
Examiner of Commercial Practices often results in delays which can 
frustrate takeover action. Because of the large amounts of money 
involved delays can often prove expensive and discourage continu-
ation of an offer. Opportunities for economic gains can often be 
missed because of the time required to obtain consents. It would 
therefore be unwise to require the Securities Commission to approve 
takeovers before they could go ahead. The Ontario approach, 
however, does seem to be a good idea. The Commission should provide 
an advisory service so that when takeovers are being prepared, 
compliance can be ensured at an early stage of proceedings. This 
however should not be a mandatory requirement because of the 
possibility of delays frustrating takeovers. 
Overall the role of the Commission should, in addition to its 
present law reform role, be supervisory but not unduly interven-
tional. Takeovers should be allowed to proceed unhindered as long 
as they comply with the legislative requirements of fairness. 
Parties should be encouraged to protect their own interests as far 
as they practically can. Investors enter the securities market 
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voluntarily and therefore should be expected to mainly bear the 
responsibility for protecting their own interests. The Commission's 
intervention should be sparing and used only to protect those who 
are unable to protect themselves. 
5. 
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CONCLUSION 
The rules relating to company takeovers in New Zealand certainly 
need reform. The 1963 Companies Amendment Act has been shown to be 
unable to achieve even its limited objectives. The Stock Exchange 
has attempted to fill the gap with the Takeover Code of its Listing 
Manual but this too is unsatisfactory. Despite the Court of 
Appeal's vindication of the Exchange's power to make these rules as 
terms of the Listing Agreement, the Exchange is not the appropriate 
body to assume the responsibility for takeover control. The 
Exchange is limited by the scope and application of its remedies. 
In the N.Z.F.P. - Wattie example, suspension proved to be a particu-
larly ineffective sanction, having very little direct effect. 
Further serious doubts about the role of the Exchange are raised. 
The control of takeover conduct does not fit easily with the 
Exchange' s primary role of regulating its members and its members 
business on the Exchange. Altogether the Exchange is the wrong body 
to take primary responsibility for such fundamentally important 
control. 
The N.Z.F.P. takeover offer for Wattie demonstrated that there is a 
need for responsibility to be taken at a higher legislative level. 
Legislative control of company takeovers has long been accepted as 
necessary in overseas jurisdictions and the adoption of similar 
legislation in New Zealand seems inevitable. The N.Z.F.P. - Wattie 
situation has however shown that serious thought needs to be given 
to the commercial realities involved in such legislation. Protec-
tion of minority interests, whatever their size or nature, should 
not be traded off for commercial convenience. It is equally as 
wrong to assume that all takeovers are good as it is to assume all 
takeovers are bad. A takeover law should be neither for nor against 
takeovers but should merely make them possible under rules which 
provide even handed fairness to the participants. Flexibility to 
adapt to commercial situations should be built in to the rules. 
Hard and fast rules will not be appropriate to all situations and 
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the ability to reach a fair result would be an asset to any rules. 
The Securities Commission could usefully fill this role. 
The recommendations of the Securities Commission have struck a 
balance between fairness and practicality. They are not unduly 
onerous or bureaucratic while providing substantial protection for 
minority shareholders. The N.Z.F.P.-Wattie example shows that the 
rules will extend all the protection available to the financially 
powerful, at a substani tal saving of shareholders funds. Accusa-
tions that regulation will lead to economic losses because of a 
reduction in takeover activity seem to be unfounded. 
What forms legislative control will take only time will tell. 
Rushing into such an important field of legislation is definitely 
unwise and the far reaching economic effects of regulation need to 
be carefully considered. The United Kingdom, Canada, Australia and 
the Lni ted States have all recognised the need for such legisla-
tion. New Zealand must now make a decision about what forms of 
control best suits our needs. 
- 86 -
6. FOOTNOTES 
1. This probably represents of only a small proportion of 
the actual takeovers made, since only limited classes 
of takeover need to be referred to the Commssion. 
2. New Zealand Forest Products Limited v. New Zealand 
Stock Exchange (Lrirep. A.15/84 7.9 1984) and New 
Zealand Stock Exchange v. Listed Companies Association 
Inc. - New Zealand Forest Products Limited (Unrep. 
A.83/84 11.6 1984). 
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21. 
22. 
- 88 -
shares have limited voting rights. In a show of hands 
every shareholder has one vote. In a poll voting 
entitlements are calculated as follows: 
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